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ABSTRACT 
Nationalism in Southeast Europe: how does nationalism function in the age of 
globalization? 
The purpose of this study is to explain how nationalism came into being as a modern 
phenomenon and how it took shape in Southeast Europe where numerous ethnic communities 
coming from different cultural backgrounds coexisted throughout the centuries. Nationalism is 
a crucial doctrine that changed and shaped our world remarkably in recent centuries, and 
currently it is still the most plausible option for state legitimacy. However, nationalism is also 
prone to cause conflicts and wars between different nations/states in the Balkans as elsewhere. 
In order to understand the problematic sides of nationalism, it is of necessity to analyze and 
shed light on the questions from interdisciplinary perspectives. According to the results of this 
study, the objective and comprehensible understanding of historical events are of importance 
to elucidate the origins of nationalism in Southeast Europe. In addition to the historical aspects, 
this work also aimed to show how the nation-states produce excessive national sentiments 
among their citizens through schools and media channels. Particularly history education proved 
effective in creating the negative images of others in our minds that paved the way for ethnic 
strife and wars. 
Key words: Nationalism, nation-states, Southeast Europe, history education, media. 
 
POVZETEK 
Nacionalizem v jugovzhodni Evropi: kako deluje nacionalizem v dobi globalizacije? 
Namen te študije je razložiti kako je nacionalizem postal moderni fenomen ter kako se je 
oblikoval v jugovzhodni Evropi, kjer etnične skupine različnih zgodovinskih izvorov sobivajo 
že stoletja. Nacionalizem predstavlja ključno teorijo oz. doktrino, ki je spremenila in oblikovala 
naš svet v zadnjem času, hkrati pa predstavlja najbolj verjetno podlago za legitimnost države. 
Kljub temu pa je nacionalizem tudi eden izmed razlogov konfliktov med narodi in državami 
tako na območju Balkana, kot tudi v svetu. Da lahko razumemo ta del nacionalizma, moramo 
odgovore na vprašanja o nacionalizmu poiskati z interdisciplinarnim pristopom. Glede na 
rezultate te študije, je razumevanje zgodovinskih dogodkov izrednega pomena za razlago 
vzrokov in izvorov nacionalizma v jugovzhodni Evropi. Ta študija prikazuje, ob podajanju 
zgodovinskih pregledov, kako nacionalne države ustvarjajo in spodbujajo občutke narodne 
pripadnosti med državljani z uporabo šolskega sistema in medijskih kanalov. Ravno poučevanje 
zgodovine se je izkazalo kot najbolj učinkovito orodje v procesu ustvarjanja negativnih podob 
drugih narodov in s tem tlakovanja poti za etnične spore in celo vojne med narodi in državami. 
Ključne besede: Nacionalizem, nacionalne države, jugovzhodna Evropa, zgodovinsko 
izobraževanje, mediji. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Formulation 
Nations and nationalism are highly interesting concepts that deserve further research and 
elaboration. It is clear that nationalism emerged as a modern phenomenon that created a new 
form of political and social organization. The empires, kingdoms, city-states have been replaced 
by nation-states, boundaries were redrawn and during this process several wars have been 
fought in order to establish national sovereignty. It is worth noting that two world wars 
emanated from national aspirations and struggles. Nowadays we live in the nation-state system 
that is considered the most plausible option for the state legitimacy, however, at the same time 
the world gets more interconnected and national borders start to lose significance. That being 
said, it seems that nationalism is getting more popular despite the increasing globalization. It is 
of essence to understand whether this perception is correct and clarify the reasons behind it. 
Southeast Europe would be considered a perfect region regarding nationalism studies, since 
numerous nations belonging to different civilizations (Kulturkreis) inhabit in this region.1 Even 
though they share many common cultural characteristics, cooperation and integration between 
the Balkans states proved difficult due to the animosities originating from national aspirations. 
The independence situation of Kosovo, ethnic tensions between Albanians and Macedonians in 
Macedonia (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), the sui generis situation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina which is composed of two entities, namely the Bosniak-Croat Federation and 
the Republic of Srpska, the question over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey would be 
regarded as some crucial points of the main conflicts. On the other hand, it would be incorrect 
to correlate the Balkans with extraordinary violence and incessant strife. (Hatzoupoulous, 2008, 
p. 1). Maria Todorova (2009, p. 11) coined the term Balkanism that refers to attitudes and 
actions towards the Balkans. That said, it should be delved into the
                                                 
1 From historical standpoint, Southeast Europe would be considered as crossroads of civilizations where various 
communities/nations inhabited. It was the location where the Roman Empire had been divided into two parts that 
has later become a conflict zone between Orthodox and Catholic Christians stemming from the results of Great 
Schism. Moreover, after the conquests of the Ottomans, Muslim communities have been emerged. It is thus 
possible to speak of three different civilizations in Southeast Europe. 
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reasons why and how this negative perception of the Balkans originated. The main point is to 
show the unique features of the Balkan nationalism.2 
Although many academic works are present on this issue, it is still required to conduct more 
research and develop different approaches to the question. It cannot be denied that nationalism 
has and is still playing an important role in the Balkans (Hatzoupoulos, 2008, pp. 1-2). Two 
Balkan Wars, conflicts and military confrontations in two world wars and the recent violent 
disintegration of Yugoslavia could be given as examples in this respect. It is quite difficult not 
only for foreigners but also for the locals to understand the conflict between these states that 
are highly interconnected with each other in many ways. To understand and explain this 
question, it is necessary to avoid reductionism, as nationalism is too complex to explain with a 
single factor, on the contrary, one needs to take into consideration various factors by comparing 
and analyzing them. This study aims to shed light on nationalism in Southeast Europe from 
different perspectives. 
1.2 Research Theses and Questions 
It is clear that nationalism plays a huge role in the political and social lives of many people 
worldwide. In this paper, I will focus on the Balkan Peninsula, since it is one of the interesting 
regions where ethnic/nationalist conflicts take place although the Balkan nations share many 
common cultural values. It is necessary to focus on the origins of nationalism and how 
nationalism creates conflicts and confrontations between Southeast European nations that are 
highly close to each other in a cultural sense.  
The popularity of nationalism in the Balkans could be explained not only by one factor but by 
numerous factors, that is, it would be related to political, historical, sociological and other 
reasons that should be analyzed and explained exclusively in the thesis. Having said that, 
nationalism is in fact popular almost all around the world, but the question is why the Balkans 
are always associated with (excessive) nationalism and why did such a perception emerge? In 
the course of my assignment, I will also consider the following questions. How did the 
nationalism in the Balkans emerge? Which factors affected the spread and popularity of 
nationalism in Southeast Europe? To what extent does Balkan nationalism differ from Western 
European nationalism? Why has socialism as a counter-ideology failed against nationalism? 
                                                 
2 Southeast Europe and the Balkans refer to the same region, however, due to the fact that the latter is often used 
as a pejorative metaphor. Thus, many researchers prefer to call the region merely as Southeast Europe. Yet, this 
kind of thinking should be avoided; therefore, it would be better to use both terms interchangeably. 
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How can nationalism function and exert its influence in the Balkans currently in the age of 
globalization?  
1.3 Methodology 
The roots of nationalism in the Balkans are quite old and needs to be analyzed meticulously. 
Since these states have a deep-rooted history and unique traditions, it does not come as a 
surprise that nationalism could exert heavy influence in the region. Therefore, as a first move, 
I am going to clarify what nationalism refers to and explain the historical formation of Balkan 
nations and reasons which makes nationalism as a popular and influential ideology.  
Mixed methods (combining quantitative and qualitative methods) would be adopted in this 
research which would provide us to analyze and evaluate the reasons for the influence of 
nationalism among the nations in the Balkans and it would enable to develop new approaches 
and solutions to curb the ethnoconfessional hatred that may pave the way for the stability and 
prosperity in the region. Combining methods research and the combination of data obtained 
through the use of different methods could be identified as a key element in the improvement 
of the social sciences (Gorard and Taylor 2004, p. 7).  
First, I will delve into how nationalism has emerged among Balkan nations and the state-
building process. Formation of nationalism has varied from region to region, so it is crucial to 
gain a deeper insight with regard to the historical formation of nations. Furthermore, I will go 
through and examine different sources (books, newspapers, encyclopedias, videos etc.), which 
were produced in English, German and Turkish languages, that would help us to understand the 
matter from different viewpoints. It would also enable us to make comparisons and deduce from 
them more reliable outcomes. 
As for the second main question, I will address why nationalistic sentiments remain powerful 
among southeastern European nations. Even though it is more related to qualitative methods, 
as it is basically an explanatory question, the quantitative methods (numerical data, former 
surveys, creating new surveys if necessary) may be useful in certain areas regarding this 
question. Currently, mixing method is getting more and more common because of the fact that 
quantitative and qualitative methods should not necessarily oppose rather complement each 
other as each method has its own strengths and weaknesses. It was a huge debate regarding the 
use of mixed methods among academic circles before 1990 whether it is appropriate to mix 
quantitative and qualitative methods. On the one hand, there were authors who oppose mixed 
methods due to the incompatibility between quantitative and qualitative methods, on the other 
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hand, other authors developed a pragmatic approach arguing that quantitative and qualitative 
methods were compatible with each other and rejected either-or choices (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2009, p. 15). After the 90’s most researchers got bored with this philosophical debate and they 
started to get on with the task of their research instead (ibid., p. 15). The mixed method debate 
has been resolved for many researchers today and it is more common to use mixed methods in 
the social sciences. On the other hand, we should not be obsessed too much with the methods 
rather it would be better to focus on the questions and problems. Shapiro and Green criticized 
this situation and argued that method-driven research causes to the self-serving construction of 
problems (Shapiro, 2005, p. 54). Therefore, political science would be more useful if it deals 
with current problems/crises as a priority and offers analysis/solutions to them.  
It is vital to make use of various former works that were written regarding this research question 
and the thing which we need is to develop new perspectives on the research question. As Gleen 
Firebaugh (2008, p. 6) argued that a good research should contain surprise in it. Basically, one 
can assert that it is important to obtain new results and create a different and broader perspective 
for the research question. It is necessary not to repeat the previous results but to produce new 
outcomes. Under the circumstances, I will also focus on the invisible and informal aspects of 
power that provides nationalism to function. By doing so, I believe new and surprising 
outcomes may be obtained.  
Moreover, an interdisciplinary approach is necessary while carrying out this research, since the 
question encompasses areas including political science, history, sociology, philosophy etc. 
What is lacking in the current scholarship is an interdisciplinary approach because complicated 
problems cannot be explained solely by one factor. For instance, this question cannot be 
understood merely in the lights of historiography, on the contrary, it is needed to shed light on 
the question from sociological, cultural, political perspectives. When I was carrying out my 
initial research I observed that most of the authors have only focused on the historical reasons, 
and yet I hold the view that researchers need to take into account political and sociological 
reasons as well. 
In the end, after collecting the data through mixed methods I will examine them separately, 
merge and interpret the outcomes. It is important to produce actual and unusual results by using 
different methods in order to contribute to the advancement of knowledge.  
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2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Proto-Nationalism in the Balkans 
There is no doubt that nationalism is a crucial phenomenon that changed our world remarkably 
particularly through the transformation of the state. Throughout the history, political 
organizations had various forms such as tribal communities, kingdoms, empires and city-states. 
Since the nation-state is a modern concept, it is not possible to speak of nationalism in the pre-
modern era. During this study, this question will be elaborated but first, it is of utmost necessity 
to understand the pre-modern societies and their political organizations. 
So, how people used to identify themselves before the nation-state system which would be the 
first question that should be enlightened. In fact, it is one of the most difficult tasks because 
before the 19th century, most of the world population were illiterate; thus, it would be not easy 
to understand the ideas and sentiments of the majority of people at the time (Roser and Ortiz-
Ospina, 2018, para. 2). Only the sources which have been written by the intellectuals may 
inform us regarding the social, political and economic life before the formation of nations. 
Certainly, it would have been better if we had taken the feelings of the peasantry into 
consideration as they played a crucial role in the formation of nations. For example, without 
Estonian peasantry, there would not have been the Estonian nation because they were the ones 
who spoke Estonian language and maintained the customs, whereas their nobles used to speak 
German; however, the Estonian peasants did not have national aspirations at the time 
(Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 48). The same example could be given for many other nations, in this 
case, one could argue that the peasantry played a vital role during the formation of nations. The 
nobility did not want to share their position with members of society as the nobility considered 
itself high above the society. Consequently, there was no factor that could push the idea of 
nationalism.  
At this point, it is possible to point out that the French Revolution was one of the turning points 
in history along with other major events such as the Industrial Revolution and the 
Enlightenment especially with regard to nationalism studies. People who used to live before the 
18th century they identified themselves differently than today. The inhabitants who were living 
in the lands what we call today France or England did not consider themselves as French or 
English because they had no conception of a territorial nation to which they owed an allegiance 
stronger than life itself (Billig, 1995, p.21). Allegiances and dedications were made to the Kings 
and Lords. It is necessary to point out that loyalty to the King was also related to God, since 
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people at the time considered the Kings as the shadows of the divine power. This perception 
was common pretty much all around the world from Europe to the Far East.3 The community 
was a distinct conception and they lived in different ways. Under the circumstances, there was 
no conception of nation in terms of our current understanding. Besides, in pre-modern times 
nation (nacio) had various connotations (Dann, 1995, p. 29; Davies 2004, p. 570) i.e. it could 
mean many things. For instance, it could refer to several peoples or student groupings at 
medieval universities, however, it could also mean the nation in the sense we use it today, for 
example, the letters of the native prince of Wales, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, addressed to the 
people of Wales as nostra nacio (Davies, 2004, p. 570). The important point is that pre-modern 
nations/communities do not correspond to modern nations due to the fact that the context of 
political power and social organization in which they operate is different (ibid., p. 571). 
The identities were not associated with the ethnicity nor nationality but rather the dedication 
excelled the merits of identification and this dedication was directly related to religion and their 
representatives that were Lords and religious institutions. Viroli (1995, p. 21) clarified this 
situation arguing that “vassals and knights who fought and died for their lords, were sacrificing 
themselves pro domino, not pro patria to honor a bond of fidelity or faith not to discharge a 
civil duty.” In previous times, wars were fought for causes which now seem incomprehensibly 
trivial (Billig, 1995, p. 1).  
Raymond Detrez (2013, p. 13) argued that proto-nationalist era in the Balkans could be traced 
back to the period in history that started after the Ottoman conquest and terminated with the 
penetration of nationalism as an ideology and beginning of nation and state-building process. 
For the understanding of the formation of Southeast European nations, it is necessary to 
consider the structures of two empires viz. the Ottoman and Austria/Habsburg Empires as their 
state regulations and structures affected considerably during the formation process.4 
One important factor would be the so-called millet system that affected remarkably nation and 
state-building process of the Balkan nations. Millet does not refer to the nation but rather the 
community gathering around a religious doctrine (Ortaylı, 2003, p. 11, Sadoğlu, 2016, p. 4). 
This sui-generis structure divided communities along with religious lines. Ethnolinguistic 
                                                 
3 For instance, Japanese Emperors were considered as direct ascendants of the Sun-Goddess (Ozkirimli, 2017, p. 
68) 
4 In the early 19th century, the Habsburg Empire encompassed the area which are Slovenia, most of Croatia, 
Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat in Southeast Europe, whereas the Ottoman Empire encompassed relatively 
more, namely, from Greece to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jelavich, 1986; Lampe, 2000). 
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factors were not considered essential and even neglected i.e. it is not possible to speak of 
Turkish, Albanian or Greek communities, but Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian 
Apostolic and Jewish communities existed. When asked his identity, an average Balkan person 
used to identify himself with Orthodox Romaic identity or Muslim, Catholic identity etc. 
(Karpat, 1997, p. 334). These religion-based identities were quite strong even in 1936 Sir Harry 
Luke (Detrez, 2013, p. 39) wrote: ‘But to this day Orthodox peasants, not only in Greece but even at 
times in Serbia and Bulgaria speak of themselves as Romans… The word ‘Roman’ thus included not 
only the Greeks of Hellas, the islands, the capital city and the various Greek centres of Asia Minor, but 
also the Serbs, the Rumanians and the Bulgarians of the Balkan peninsula and the Arab- speaking 
Orthodox communities of Syria, Palestine and Egypt.’ 
This is anything but surprising because of the fact that this kind of social organization is quite 
old and dated back to the Eastern Roman times. The Greeks called themselves neither Greeks 
nor Hellenes because they associated the Hellenic identity with Paganism (Lindstedt, 2012, p. 
108). The national identities, which we use it today, were secondary identities that did not take 
precedence at the time. All social, economic and political structures were based on this model 
i.e. communities were inhabiting in certain areas and separately from each other. Rich or poor 
Armenians used to live in the same neighborhood, unlike today the neighborhoods were 
designed according to the income of individuals without regard to any national and religious 
affiliation. This should not be considered as a kind of discrimination because all communities 
were content with this situation at the time, say, an Orthodox Christian did not consent the 
marriage of his son/daughter with any member of other communities (Ortaylı, 2003, p. 126.). 
It would be of essence to mention that religious institutions played crucial roles at that time. 
During the rule of Eastern Roman Empire, these communities established autocephalous and 
autonomous churches in the Balkans.5 After the Ottoman conquests, these institutions have been 
annexed to the Greek Patriarchate of Istanbul so that all Orthodox Christians were subjected to 
this institution except the Prince-Bishopric of Montenegro, since a Vladika appointed by the 
Ottoman Sultan had the right to rule Montenegro (Arnakis, 1963, p. 129). It is important to 
underline these events because religious institutions regulated the social lives of his subjects 
through schools, monasteries, marriages etc. By doing so, it cleared the way unintentionally for 
Greek cultural hegemony over other Orthodox communities.  
It is vital to note that the Ottoman millet system did not last forever especially after the French 
revolution, it has been tried to create a common Ottoman identity among all communities in the 
                                                 
5 These were the Tarnovo Patriarchate, the Patriarchate of Pec and the Archbishopric of Ohrid. 
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Ottoman Empire. Tanzimat (1839) and Islahat Reforms (1856) have put an end to the millet 
system and granting all communities equal rights within the state (Vovchenko, 2016, p. 104). 
This ideology is called Ottomanism that was a practical response to the modern nationalism. 
Ottomanism, in the words of Ortaylı (2003, p.28), was a pragmatic and patriotic nationalism 
that encompassed all ethnic groups within the empire. Having said that, this attempt was a late 
response that could not stop the dissolution of the Empire. On the other hand, the Habsburg 
Empire had quite a different structure i.e. before 1804 she was a part of the Holy Roman Empire 
and only after this date it is possible to speak of the Austrian Habsburg Empire that transformed 
into the Dual Monarch in 1867 (Simms, 2014, p. 240). In the lands of the Habsburgs several 
different nationalities used to live, most of them remained loyal to the Crown until the 
dissolution of the Empire. Clearly, the Holy Roman and Habsburg Empires had different 
structures than the Ottomans, namely they had a different state structure, but one thing was the 
same which was the sort of identification of the people. Just like other communities, ethnic ties 
were not of vital importance in pre-modern times. Jelavich (1983, p.133) describes the social 
and political life in the Habsburg Empire as follows: 
As in the Ottoman Empire, the social divisions were accepted as part of the natural order 
ordained by God. Church and State both taught the message that a good life is that spent in 
fulfilling as well as possible the function to which one is assigned. Crossing social lines was 
extremely difficult in both societies. This view was accepted by the peasant as well as by the 
lord. Peasant rebellion at first was directed not toward obtaining new rights, but against lords 
who were not carrying out their part of this tacit bargain and were instead encroaching on 
peasant prerogatives. 
The patriotism was defined as the loyalty to the Emperor and his House. Ethnic names could 
vary such as in the example of Habsburg Serbs. In the earliest Habsburg charter for the Border 
issued by Ferdinand I. these settlers were called Serbs or Rascians (Serviani seu Rasciani) and 
a century later the Grenzer privileges were codified by Ferdinand II. In the Statuta Valachorum 
(Trifković, 2011, “The Militärgrenze”, para. 4). The Habsburg Serbs were called themselves 
Serbs, but they were also Grenzer as soldiers, Rascians geographically, Vlachs as shepherds 
(ibid.). So, it was then natural to have different (national) identities, since it was not politically 
significant and caused neither confusion nor troubles.  
2.2 The French Revolution and the Emergence of Nationalism 
There is no doubt that the French Revolution was one of the most important historical events 
that affected and shaped our current world system, however, the birth of nationalism is in fact 
more complex than one usually tends to believe. It would be not appropriate to correlate the 
emergence of nationalism with a single event. The nation-state system was evolved out of a 
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combination of the French Absolutism, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution6 that 
over time spread all around the world mainly through European colonial powers and efforts of 
local intellectuals. In the Balkan case, it happened through importation of these ideas by the 
Balkan intelligentsia and to a lesser extent through external intervention. 
It does not come as a surprise that nationalism is a Western European socio-political 
construction, since during the Enlightenment rationalism has become the norm that shifted 
peoples’ devotion from the Church to the idea of fatherland. Earlier the Church was in the center 
of people’s lives in Western/Central Europe, and yet during the Enlightenment Europeans 
perceived a radical separation between God and the world and they started to confine religion 
into the private sphere of life and separate it from politics. (O’Leary, 1998, p. 40). Therefore, it 
could be argued that nationalism was there to fill this gap in the absence of religion. Nationalism 
was an inevitable outcome of the Enlightenment era because when religion ceased to function 
to unify people and secure the state legitimacy, a new order had to be created. Essentially, 
nationalism has replaced religion as a raison d’être of the states in Western Europe. Not 
functioning without a specific set of values, the state needs a collective identity for the 
justification of political legitimacy and social order. Previously, it was the King and the Church, 
and yet they started to lose their legitimacy through revolts/revolutions, and thus national unity 
has become the main element for the state legitimacy. People thought what could be more 
natural than those, who share the same ethnicity and speak the same language, come together 
to form a state. It was Herder’s idea that blood and soil (Blut und Boden) should be the 
wellsprings of national belonging and German legions were fighting against the world for their 
Volk (League of Nationalist, 2016, para. 1). Herder and Fichte were declaring that the basis of 
a nation must lay in its language (Billig, 1995, pp. 32-33).7 However, modern nationalism has 
appeared first in western Europe and also in the United States as a result of the Enlightenment 
thought then romantic thinkers reconstructed and changed civic nationalism into ethnic 
nationalism. Western European/ American civic nationalism differs remarkably from Central 
European ethnic nationalism on the grounds that the former values and emphasizes the universal 
truths, rights of the individual and intellectual thought, whereas the latter stressed the unique 
truth, right of the group and emotional thought (White, 2000, p. 52). Basically, romantic ethnic 
                                                 
6 As a matter of fact, it would be argued that the Enlightenment as well as the Industrial Revolution were 
unintended results of the Protestant Reformation; thus, it is plausible to deduce that the Reformation had an impact 
on the birth of nationalism, albeit indirectly. 
7 During the Unification of Germany, predominantly Catholic kingdoms of Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg took 
sides with Protestant Prussia against France (secular but still Catholic majority) due to the fact that ethnic and 
linguistic factors started to predominate over religious ties (Simms, 2014, p. 238). 
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nationalism produced a collectivistic-authoritarian model of the nation while civic nationalism 
was of an individualistic-libertarian nature (Wachtel, 1998, p. 7). 
It should be noted that the scholars are not in accordance with the origins of nations and 
nationalism. Hence, a number of theories are available how and when the nationalism came into 
being. Primordialism/Perennialism rejected the idea that nationalism is a construction of the 
modern era, on the contrary, they argued that ethnic boundaries are in fact primordial that would 
be dated back remote epochs, certainly predating the modernity (Conversi, 2007, p. 15, 20). 
They hold the view that nations are basically given and natural phenomenon; thus, it is 
completely natural. Perennialists differ slightly from the Primordialists by arguing that nations 
are not a fact of nature, but the nation is a product of enduring, inveterate, century-long even 
millennial process (Ozkirimli, 2017). Moreover, Ethnosymbolism takes an in-between 
approach i.e. “Ethnosymbolism underlines the continuity between premodern and modern 
forms of social cohesion, without overlooking the changes brought about by modernity” 
(Conversi, 2007, p.21). Ethnosymbolism was coined by Anthony Smith who argued that not all 
nations have been invented or created, meaning, some identities must have existed in pre-
modern times which he calls ethnies8 (Billig, 1995, p. 26).  
In the light of this knowledge, it is of necessity to elaborate on the matter. It is true that people 
were always aware of their ethnicity, however, nationalism refers to a broader concept than the 
awareness of ethnic ties. In the first place, under nationalism, we should understand a mass 
movement including all strata of the society trying to replace the old political legitimacy that 
was based on the divine right of the kings. Certainly, some people had nationalist sentiments 
before the modernity such as Paisiy Hilendarski who wrote the history of the Bulgarians 
(Todorova, 2005, p. 151; Ortaylı, 2008, p. 27) and demanded that the Bulgarians should know 
their national background and be proud of it. He also emphasized that the Bulgarians are not 
Greeks as the Bulgarian nobility identified itself with the Greek/Romaic identity at the time. As 
we can see, this is a nationalistic approach, however, Hilendarski was a lonely voice and 
discovered in the modernity by newly emerging Bulgarian intelligentsia. Having said that, Aviel 
Roshwald argued in his book ‘The Endurance of Nationalism’ that not only nations but also the 
nationalism existed in the ancient world by giving example ancient Israel (Ozkirimli, 2017, p. 
                                                 
8 In the pre-modern era, even though the community was imagined different than today it is still possible to speak 
of ethnies, however, the point is that it cannot be mentioned about any contuinity between the ethnies and the 
modern nation. Basically the modern nation refers to a broader concept than ethnies. For example, some nations 
consist of several ethnies while others may come from only one ethnic background. 
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68). Nonetheless, this definition of nationalism is a reductionism; thus, ancient Israel or ancient 
Greece would not be regarded as nations but rather cultural collective identities. Their state 
apparatus was completely different from the current understanding of the nation-state.9 Today 
nationalism in effect refers to not an elite but a mass phenomenon which, of course, have been 
imposed from above that could only occur at an advanced stage of modernity, since the 
improvement of modern mass communication made it possible for the ethnic elite to spread 
national ideas among larger sectors of the society. The question is that why the nobility wanted 
to create a homogenous society and give up their privileges stemming from hierarchical 
dichotomies? Basically, it can be argued that the Industrial Revolution changed the social class 
structure by constructing a new class, namely the workers’ class. This is highly important 
because of the fact that this new class was a necessary component for the development of the 
state. In return, the transition between social classes has become possible which paved the way 
for the social homogenization.10 
Moreover, according to Brass primordial attachments are clearly variable (Ozkirimli, 2017, p. 
61). People did not attach to their language with any emotional significance, as they could speak 
different languages, dialects. The ethnic ties, kinship could be considered politically 
insignificant. Ethnic/linguistic roots of the rulers did not have any significance for the ruled 
because the crucial factor was the justice and economic prosperity for the latter (ibid.). It is also 
important to state that hierarchical lines were much stronger in pre-modern times i.e. a sharp 
line divided the society into two parts mainly the aristocracy and common people. The transition 
between these two compartments was highly difficult. The peasantry was confined to 
agriculture and social advancements were not possible, whereas the nobles used to associate 
only with other nobles even from different states.  
In recent years, a number of theories have been developed by authors such as Gellner (2006), 
Hobsbawm (2012), Kedourie (1966), Anderson (2006). They tried to explain the formation of 
modern nationalism from different viewpoints. Since we are lacking a general theory, it is 
needed to rely on different approaches each of which would illuminate a corner of the broader 
                                                 
9 The state legitimacy was not based on the sovereignty of nation and there was no social homogenization which 
are necessary elements for the definition of nation. 
10 The fact that the Industrial Revolution has created a capitalist culture that was not existed in pre-modern times. 
It was non-existent because the capacity of production was limited, and yet due to the invention of new 
technologies such as the steam engine and subsequently factories, it has become possible to manufacture in an 
unlimited scale. Moreover, peasants started to migrate from the villages to cities where a different, common high 
culture has been emerged in due course. Considering these facts, the interdependency between social classes has 
increased that paved the way for the social cohesion. 
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canvas as Anthony Smith puts it (Conversi, 2007, p. 26). According to Craig Calhoun (1997, 
p.123): “Nationalism is too diverse to allow a single theory to explain it all. Much of the 
contents and specific orientation of various nationalisms is determined by historically distinct 
cultural traditions, the creative actions of the leaders and contingent situations within the 
international world order.” 
Ellie Kedourie (1966) was one of the leading nationalism theorists arguing that nationalism was 
essentially a European phenomenon, carried around the world by colonial circumstances. Since 
the huge part of the world was under the governance of European colonial powers at the end of 
the 19th century, this statement is highly plausible. Benedict Anderson (2006, p. 6) referred the 
nations as imagined communities, he meant they are imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign due to the fact that the concept was born when the Enlightenment destroyed the 
thoughts of divinely ordained legitimacy and hierarchy. What is more, it is imagined because 
individuals in a society develop ties with the people they do not know and probably will not 
know in their entire lives, and yet still a strong tie has been constructed among these people 
mainly due to the advancement of informational technologies. 
Furthermore, the theories of Hobsbawm and Gellner could be considered highly effective for 
the elaboration of the birth of nationalism. According to them, nationalism is a social 
construction/engineering, an artificial entity. Gellner (2006) stated that nations are not formed 
through ideology or proto-jingoism but through the necessity for the existence of a modern and 
industrial society. One of the most vital points of Gellner is that the political and national unit 
should be congruent for the formation of nations (ibid., p.1). For a better understanding of this 
argument, he divided human history into three epochs which were human-gatherer, agro-literate 
and industrial eras (ibid.). During the first stage, it is not possible to speak of power and culture 
relations. Agro-literate society defined the power relations as two different class emerged i.e. 
the ruling class used culture to discern itself from the large majority of peasant communities. 
Therefore, there is no incentive for rulers to impose cultural homogeneity on the ruled class as 
they derive benefits from this diversity. Industrial revolution paved the way for cultural 
homogenization as culture becomes crucial in its own right and power relations have been 
redefined by virtue of the fact that exo-socialization has deposed the line between the rulers and 
the ruled and new social classes are born (ibid.). 
However, Gellner’s theory did not provide a full-fledged explanation of nationalism because 
the non-industrialized states managed to become nation-states. Gellner has argued further that 
he used industrialization in a broad sense and focused on rather on the emergence of nationalism 
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than the subsequent diffusion of nationalism by other parts of the world (Mouzelis, 1998). 
Nonetheless, we still lack a general theory of nationalism as nationalism is such a complex 
phenomenon that cannot be merely correlated with the industrialization. It is also of necessity 
to consider other factors such as technological advances, improved means of communication 
and subsequently empowerment of central authority etc. It should also be emphasized that not 
only economic developments but also structural changes in socio-political and cultural life set 
the scene for the birth of nation and nationalism. 
2.3 Nation and State-Building process in the Balkans 
It is worth noting that there are various forms of nationalism, however, I will focus on three 
models which are civic, ethnic and ethnoconfessional nationalism. Civic nationalism refers to 
a community based on common shared visions and missions such as in the United States or in 
the United Kingdom. In this case, the religion and ethnicity did not have any sort of effect 
because people come from various different ethnic origins and religious communities. What 
they have in common is that their perception of the world, in other words, their 
Weltanschauung, which is liberalism/free market economy or liberty/equality/fraternity, that 
would work as a catalyst for their unification. The second one is ethnic nationalism that has 
been shaped by Romantic philosophy (White, 2000, p. 54) and could be observed mostly in 
Central and Eastern Europe e.g. Germany, Italy, Slovenia and so on. Ethnic/linguistic factors 
have been considered as the main elements for the nation and state-building process. 
Religious/confessional differences were considered ineffective. The last form was 
ethnoconfessional nationalism that was to be found in the Balkans11 (Bardos, 2013). It is quite 
a difficult task to explain the nationalism in Southeast Europe as the peninsula was under the 
control of two different empires in the age of nationalism and the area between Belgrade and 
Zagreb has experienced frequent handovers.12 Therefore, Central European romantic 
nationalism has become influential and effective mostly in Slovenian lands and the rest of the 
peninsula has been under influence of Ottoman millet system that paved the way for the 
formation of ethnoconfessional nationalism. It is worth noting that nationalism has several 
                                                 
11 However, ethnoreligious/ethnoconfessional nationalism is not a special case for Southeast Europe as it could be 
observed in other parts of the world as well. 
12 The Habsburg Empire consisted of many nationalities just like his rival Ottoman Empire and encompassed the 
area from Slovenia to Romanian lands such as Transylvania and Banat while the Ottomans encompassed areas 
between Greece/Bulgaria to the border of Croatia as we today know it. Furthermore, Croatian lands were parts of 
three states viz. the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Venice. 
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variations that took shape in accordance with local culture and pragmatic necessities. Peter 
Sugar (Todorova, 2005, p.150) explained this situation perfectly: 
In Central and Eastern Europe the character and nationalism changed according to local 
conditions: the farther an area was from the lands in which nationalism developed, the less its 
nationalism resembled the original model. Even such basic expressions of nationalism such as 
constitution, freedom, or republic acquired different meanings in more eastern areas of Europe. 
This is anything but surprising. People who grew up in the Orthodox world and were not 
affected by the major cultural, religious and cultural movements that transformed the Western 
Christian world- such as the scientific revolution, Renaissance, Reformation or 
Enlightenment- or by the drastic economic and social changes that accompanied them were 
bound to attach different meanings to the concept of nationalism. This was particularly the 
case for people in the Balkans who had lived under Muslim rule for centuries. 
Therefore, one can argue that there is not only one recipe for the nationalism because different 
communities have different perception of nationalism as a concept. In most of Southeast 
Europe, people have not experienced events that took place in Western/Central Europe. Hence, 
it cannot be expected that they follow the same path, on the contrary, they imagined and 
reconstructed nationalism as it would fit into their societies. In the West, the nationalism 
emerged as a substitute for the religion, however, in the Balkans nationalism has been 
developed as a modern necessity merging with religious components. Even though most of the 
intellectuals of the Balkan elites studied in Europe and were impressed by either civic or ethnic 
nationalism, they could not impose these values on their own communities because the social 
and cultural structure of the Balkan societies did not permit it. 
Miroslav Hroch delineated three successive phases of nation-building process (ibid., p. 159). 
The first phase could be articulated as a scholarly phase when intellectuals discovered the depth 
of their culture, history and language. Of course, these intellectuals were a tiny minority as one 
Czech intellectual remarked at a meeting ‘If the ceiling were to fall on us now, that would be 
the end of national revival’ (Wachtel, 1998, p.20). The second phase is a national agitation 
phase i.e. the patriotic intelligentsia seeks to awaken national consciousness among the 
members of the nation and begins a political campaign for this idea and the last stage is the era 
of mass national movements when national consciousness becomes a social phenomenon 
(Todorova, 2005, p. 159). It can be argued that nation-building process in the Balkans went 
through these stages as well (ibid., p. 159). 
The Greeks and Serbs were the first ones within the territories of the Ottoman Empire that 
obtained a national identity due to the fact that Greeks were mostly merchants and city dwellers. 
Thus, they had much more contact with the rest of Europe in comparison with other 
communities in the region. By the same token, the formation of the Serbian national identity 
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was shaped by means of communities of Habsburg Serbs (Roudometof, 2001, p. 49). Many of 
the early Serb intellectuals received their education and developed their ideas under the aegis 
of the Habsburg Monarchy, so it is expected that their ideas could be linked to Central European 
ethnic nationalism with its emphasis on the national spirit and the authenticity of the common 
people (Carmichael, 2002, p. 23). All the same, this sort of nationalism could not be imposed 
on the rest of the Serbian population as they were a part of the millet system for centuries, that 
means, Serbs could not develop ties with the Croats and Bosnian Muslims even if they used to 
speak the same language (Serbo-Croat) until 1990 and Serbian intellectuals were very well 
aware of the situation. Vuk Karadžic argued that there were five million people who speak the 
same language13 and yet they were divided by religious confession and merely three million 
orthodox consider themselves as Serbs (ibid., p. 23). 
One could argue that Balkan national movements were interconnected with each other, since 
one movement triggered the other movements. For instance, the Bulgarian or Romanian nation-
building process went through two different stages. The first one was the emancipation from 
Greek influence (Hellenization) because Greek culture has a significant influence on the 
Romanians and Bulgarians. They tried to liberate themselves not only from Ottoman political 
domination but also Greek cultural and ecclesial control (Jelavich, 1983, p. 57).14 The second 
phase was the military struggle against the Sublime Porte.15 
It is a contested issue how closely intertwined communities in the Balkans could form different 
nations, as the expectation was that the Orthodox communities should have become one nation 
due to the fact that they belonged to the same cultural civilization as they celebrated the same 
religious feasts on the same day, were baptized, married and buried in the same way and so on. 
And yet it did not happen that way. This is not possible to explain only with one factor, in fact, 
many reasons played role in this matter. However, I would like to touch upon two important 
reasons i.e. Balkan nationalism have been shaped mainly by two factors which were related to 
internal and external factors.  
It should be noted that even though the Orthodox population was considered a single 
community, some dissimilarities created obstacles for their unification. For instance, Balkan 
Peninsula has been divided in various local administrations which played an effective part in 
                                                 
13 They speak Stokavian dialect of Serbo-Croatian. 
14 The formal language of their Church was Greek/Church Slavonic, not Bulgarian nor Romanian. Speaking Greek 
was considered highly prestigious. 
15 That refers to the Ottoman State. 
20 
 
the life of the community, since these authorities were the ones that used to collect taxes and 
carry out judiciary and executive matters.16 So, the lands of Serbia, Bulgaria etc. belonged to 
different administrative units, Romania was autonomously governed by local boyars (the 
Romanian nobles). Montenegrins had an autonomous governance as the region was 
mountainous and difficult for direct governance. All of these differences with regard to 
administration proved highly difficult to form a common Orthodox (or Muslim) Balkan nation. 
The similar patterns can be observed in South America, since most of the region belonged to 
the same cultural sphere, and yet the Spanish Crown divided the administration into different 
units. Thus, it was beyond imagination to establish a common South American Latin State. 
Apart from this, the foreign intervention should be taken into account due to the fact that none 
of the European powers favoured a huge state in the Balkans. This will be touched upon later 
but first let me clarify how intertwined Balkan communities disentangled during the nation and 
state-building process. 
As mentioned earlier, Ottoman society was divided and shaped along religious-confessional 
lines, most of the population in the Balkans belonged to the Orthodox faith which makes them 
one community while Muslims, Jewish and Catholics made up the rest of the population. It is 
important to note that the Greeks were clearly more prestigious in comparison with other 
Christian inhabitants within the Empire (Jelavich, 1986, p. 10; Turan n.d., p. 245) as they were 
mostly rich merchants who had commercial colonies in Europe, created far-flung business 
networks that provided them better positions, unlike Serbs or Bulgarians. While the Greeks, 
generally speaking, were city dwellers that worked as priests, doctors, business people, 
translators and diplomats, on the other hand, other Christian Balkan communities lacked urban 
elites of their own and most of them were busy with agriculture (Daskalov, 2013, p. 152). Of 
course, it should be stated that not all Greek community members, which were called Rum 
Millet as Romios,17 come from ethnic Hellenes, but many Bulgarians, Albanians, Vlachs used 
to identify themselves with this Romaic identity because it was a high culture and a matter of 
prestige that people wanted to imitate and absorb. It was also not the intention of the ethnic 
Greeks to assimilate the other Balkan Christians in the pre-national era.  
The intensification of the Greek influence started at the beginning of early 19th century due to 
the effects of the birth of ethnic nationalism in Europe and thereby an increasing number of 
                                                 
16 It is also important to note that these local administrators had privileged status in comparison with their fellows. 
For example, they were called Chorbaji in Bulgaria or Kodzabashi in Greece (Stavrianos, 2000, p. 224). 
17 Citizen of the Roman Empire. 
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Western-educated Greek intellectuals who came back to their homes with the ideas of Western 
nationalism. At this point, the Greek cultural hegemony has become an intentional set of 
mechanism that tried to absorb all Balkan Orthodox Christians into the Greek nation (White, 
2000, p. 121). First Greek nationalist such as Rigas Velestinlis and Alexander Ypsilantis aimed 
at establishing a Greek state which would have encompassed all Balkan Peninsula based on the 
principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. This is clear that this idea has been inspired by the 
French Revolution. That being said, these attempts and revolts failed due to mainly internal 
administrative differences within the Balkan Peninsula and no powerful state favored a huge 
state in the Balkans. Only after long struggles and with international support the Greeks 
managed to establish a Greek state around Peleponnesus in 1829 (Jorga, 2005, p. 294).  
At this point, other Balkan communities started to realize their own history and cultural values, 
whereas the Greeks had other plans, namely the expansion of her territories by embedding the 
other Orthodox Christians. In fact, Hellenization aspirations of Greek elites started as early as 
at the beginning of 19th century and they believed a full Hellenization process would have 
civilized other nations of the Balkan peninsula.18 They had, in effect, the upper hand in this 
process as most prestigious schools belonged to the Greeks and the intellectuals of other Balkan 
nations studied at these schools. Greek teachers were profoundly proud of their ancient Greek 
heritage and wanted to impose this culture upon their students including Bulgarian, Albanian 
or Vlach students (Daskalov, 2013, p. 164-165). However, this attempt produced an unexpected 
reaction, since the emerging Bulgarian intelligentsia perceived it as a threat to their beings 
(White, 2000, p. 121). Interestingly, the Bulgarian or Romanian national movement have first 
emerged as a reaction against this Greek cultural assimilation policy and subsequent fight 
against the Turks ensued. The prominent activist Stoyan Chomakov admitted that his 
nationalism was sparked due to the disdain and contemptibility of his Greek history teacher 
against the Slavic population by mentioning them with hatred and disgust (Daskalov, 2013, p. 
167). Another leading figure of Bulgarian national movement Marko Balabanov (ibid., p. 164) 
wrote: 
Greek patriotism was taken as an example. The newly created Greek kingdom woke, enlivened 
and strengthened even more the development of this Bulgarian patriotism. More than a handful 
of Bulgarians, educated in Greek, emerged as ardent Bulgarian patriots and fervent advocates 
for the advancement of their people, even if they often used not the Bulgarian, but the Greek 
language. And just as the Greeks expected their political revival would stem from a preceding 
intellectual revival, these Bulgarian patriots based on the Greek example, believed that the 
                                                 
18 It could be evaluated along the same lines with French mission civilatrice based on the idea of exportation of 
civilization to the other parts of the world. 
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intellectual revival would in time bring about the political revival of their people and they 
worked toward that. 
It can be argued that Greek nationalism paved the way for emergence of separate identities 
among Orthodox Christians inhabitants in the Balkans based on their own national language, 
history and myths. Creating myths and glorious history were essential parts to form a national 
consciousness among the people. Particularly non-Greek origin Orthodox Christians had 
difficulty during this process because they lacked a strong literature that would provide the 
rapid formation of national identity and transformation of mostly peasant communities into full-
fledged citizens.19 However, despite all these obstacles new Bulgarian intelligentsia tried to 
focus on their own national history, myths and traditional attributes. They rediscovered the 
books and ideas of Paisiy Hilendar and Russian historian Yuriy Venelins’ book Drevnie and 
nyneshnie bolgare/Bulgarians of Old and Today (Daskalov, 2013, p. 170) The newspapers, 
booklets and books did the groundwork for the formation of Bulgarian identity among ethnic 
Bulgarian communities. In the formation of Bulgarian nation-building process, one of the most 
important accomplishments was the foundation of Bulgarian exarchate in 1870 (Mylonas, 2012, 
p. 59).  
By the same token, the Romanian nation-building went through a similar pattern. It should be 
noted that Wallachia and Moldavia Principalities20 were autonomous areas within the Ottoman 
Empire. Moreover, Transylvania whose majority were ethnic Romanians belonged to the 
Habsburg Crown in the age of nationalism. The Principalities only had to pay taxes and 
leadership has to be approved by the Ottoman Sultan. After the failed attempt of unification 
with Russia (Jelavich 1991, p. 2) the leadership of the Principalities was given to the Phanariote 
Greeks that has exposed the land to Greek influence. The boyars were not content with this 
situation, for they lost their privileges and the Phanariote Greeks have carried out several 
reforms. The Romanian nobles as well as peasants did not welcome these reforms. Another 
important point is that the nobility and the peasantry were on the same page with regard to 
Greek question because like the boyars, the peasantry did not favor the Greek presence 
particularly due to the increased taxation through their rule (Jelavich C. & B., 1986, p. 88). 
Moldavian upper boyar and chronicler Ion Neculce reports at grassroots levels hate for the 
                                                 
19 The leading figures of Bulgarian national movement e.g. Ivan Seliminski, Grigor Parlichev or Vasil Aprilov 
could not express themselves well in Bulgarian but in Greek language (ibid.). The figures explain this situation in 
an excellent way. In the 1806- 1830 period merely 17 books were published whereas the numbers increased 
excessively in the post-1830 period, thus between 1830- 1870 approximately 1,600 books in Bulgarian were 
published (Roudometof, 2001, p. 132). 
20 Also called as the Christian Principalities. 
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Greeks owing to their different identity, broken Romanian and disregard of local traditions 
which caused the expulsion of the Greeks from the local community, they also tragically lost 
their lives in lynches and massacres (Iordachi 2013, pp. 99-100). From this argument it can be 
deduced that the national consciousness had started amongst Romanian population that turned 
into a political mass movement later on. These political, cultural and economic factors laid the 
foundations for unification of Wallachian/Moldavian nobles and peasantry under a collective 
Romanian identity. After the unification of two principalities in 1859 (Jorga, 2005, p. 421) their 
attention was directed towards Transylvania and Banat where huge numbers of ethnic 
Romanians inhabited. As Russian influence grew stronger in the region at the expense of 
declining Ottoman Empire that had implications for both Romanians and the Turks. With the 
Küçük Kaynarca Agreement the Russian Empire gained the right to advocate all Orthodox 
Christians residing within the territories of the Ottomans that situation also led some reforms 
in the Danubian Principalities (Jelavich C & B., 1986, p. 85).21 The Treaty of Edirne made the 
Russian influence much stronger while the Ottoman control over the Principalities became 
nominal. It is then natural that Romania along with Serbia and Montenegro declared full 
independence after the Russo-Turkish War in 1876 and Bulgaria gained autonomy that made it 
possible for her relatively late independence in 1908 (Jorga, 2005, p. 483-485, 519).  
It is worth noting that not only Christians, but also Muslim communities were living within the 
Ottoman territories, namely Bosniaks and majority of Albanians that converted to Islam during 
the Ottoman rule. The comparative advantage of Albanian and Bosnian Muslims delayed the 
emergence of their national consciousness and any liberation struggle (Veremis, 2014, p. 51). 
The uprisings of Albanians and Bosnian Muslims aimed at first not independence, but an 
autonomy within the Empire due to the economic and administrative problems. The first 
Albanian national movement has been founded under the name of League of Prizren in 1878 
(Jelavich, 1983, p. 363) and their intention was to gain autonomy rights and prevent 
encroachment of Greeks and Slavs on their lands, however, the League was shut down by the 
new government in the Porte after the Young Turks22 got in power after the abdication of Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II. in 1908. Due to these developments Bulgaria managed to proclaim total 
independence from the Ottoman State and total annexation of Bosnian and Herzegovina by 
Austro-Hungarian forces were completed (Jorga, 2005, 518-519). At this point, in the event of 
the Habsburg occupation a modern Bosnian Muslim identity commenced to assert itself 
                                                 
21 Taxes and requisitions were abolished, the boyars could not be deposed except for crime and with the consent 
of Russia and the boyars were ordered to take into consideration of the advices of Russian representatives. 
22 The Young Turk Movement was a nationalist movement within the Ottoman Empire that favored modernization. 
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(Biondich, 2011, p. 38). In fact, Albanian national leaders at first were content with the new 
Young Turk regime as the latter seemed to support the ideas of French revolution between all 
members of the remaining Ottoman society, and yet this understanding has eventually turned 
into a totalitarian regime which caused more problems for the integration of the state. Albanian 
leaders commenced to get in touch with European leaders and the British, Italian and Austro-
Hungarian leaders consented to the idea of an independent Albania (Stavrianos, 2000, pp. 510-
511). The Treaty of London left the fate of Albania to the Great Powers and at the Conference 
of Ambassadors on December 20, 1912 the independence of Albania has been recognized 
despite the complaints of Russia and France (ibid.), however, the important point was that 
almost half of the Albanians were left outside of Albania that would eventually turn into 
conflicts between the newly established Balkan states.  
As Ina Merdjanova (2013, p. 3) argues that religion undoubtedly became an important 
component in the construction of all national identities in Southeastern Europe with two 
exceptions: Albania where nationalism has been shaped merely on ethnic basis23 and Slovenia 
whose nationalism has been formed in accordance with the Central European Romantic 
nationalism. On the other hand; Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian nationalism were 
firmly entrenched in Eastern Orthodoxy, whereas Roman Catholicism formed a key dimension 
in Croat nation-building (ibid.). It could be stated that this is emanated from the Millet system 
during the Ottoman era.  
Nevertheless, it is necessary to state that religion did not play such a huge role in the formation 
of nations through Western and Central Europe in fact religion was inessential in this regard. 
Therefore, the Slovenes distinguished themselves from the Croats and formed a different nation 
merely based on linguistic differences although they share many common cultural attributes 
and predominantly belong to Catholicism. Schoepflin (2000, p. 118) mentioned that a nation 
should have its own language in order to call itself a nation. Basically, the language is the main 
criteria for the definition of nation in the Western/Central Europe. Accordingly, existence of a 
distinct language has been broadly perceived by the Slovenians as the basis for their self-
awareness as a nation. However, the important point is here that the Slovenes are not only of 
the Catholic faith but also a minority belongs to the Protestant Church (Bartolj, 2014, para. 8). 
For instance, one of the leading figures of Slovenian nationalism was a Protestant priest called 
Primož Trubar (ibid., para 4-5). Under the circumstances, they managed to form one nation 
                                                 
23 The country is composed of four different religious communities i.e. Sunni and Bektashi Islam, Catholic and 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity that makes indispensable to unite along with ethnic ties. 
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without taking into consideration the religious/confessional dissimilarities. Probably it is the 
most salient difference of the central European ethnic nationalism vis-à-vis south European 
ethnoconfessional nationalism. Catholic Armenians do not call themselves as Armenians but 
rather merely as Catholics (Ortaylı, 2003, p. 25). By the same token, Catholic Bulgarians 
(Paulicians) were considered as others by Orthodox Bulgarians (Detrez, 2013, p. 28). It is 
interesting to note that in the 19th century Plovdiv, where was a considerable number of Catholic 
Bulgarians, marriages between Orthodox and Catholic Bulgarians were as rare as marriages 
between Orthodox Bulgarians and Muslims (ibid.). At the same time, the marriages between 
Orthodox Bulgarians and Greeks were common (ibid.). 
As I wrote earlier, Albania is an exception in this case because they belong to four different 
confessions. Therefore, it could be argued that they were compelled to disregard 
religious/confessional disparities. During Enver Hoxha regime between 1945-1989, the state 
official religion has been declared atheism in order to erase the religious/confessional 
differences completely. Yet religious confessions exerted such heavy influence for other Balkan 
nations. According to the Greek constitution of 1822 and 1827 Greeks were defined as those 
who believe in Christ and were either born in the country or came to Greece from Ottoman-
held territories (Biondich, 2011, p. 18). The Greeks identified themselves with the religion, 
namely the Orthodox Christianity and Greeks counted Serbs and Bulgarians among their ranks 
until their independence. In fact, this is hardly surprising and was a legacy of the Ottoman Millet 
System.24 
Kemal Karpat (1997) pointed out external influences during the creation of nations in the 
Balkans and added that external influences were more effective than we used to think. In fact, 
state and nation-building in the Balkans were a wider European phenomenon (Biondich, 2011, 
p. 156). In the mid-19th century, the leaders of various national movements were in accordance 
with a plan that would envisage creating a confederation or federation among Orthodox Balkan 
communities under the leadership of Prince Mihailo. However, apart from Russian Panslavists, 
there was no other power that has supported this idea and eventually owing to the negotiations 
between the Greek government and Prince Mihailo that provided for acquisition of what 
Rakovski considered to be Bulgarian lands by the Greeks and the Serbs. This led to an 
                                                 
24 It is also interesting to note that Muslim Greeks in Crete were considered as Turks even though they could not 
even speak Turkish. The same situation was also valid for Turkish speaking Orthodox Christians in Central 
Anatolia around Karaman. Even though they had no knowledge of Greek language they were always considered 
as Greeks. The Turkish-Greek population exchange in 1924 undergirds this argumentation because Turkish-
speaking Orthodox Christians in Turkey and Greek-speaking Muslims in Greece have been included in the 
exchange agreement. 
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estrangement between Serb leaders and Bulgarian nationalists (Roudometof, 2001, pp. 77-78). 
In previous years, the Greek leader Ypsilantis had similar plans, and yet these plans have come 
to naught. 
One of the factors why Balkan communities could not establish a confederation state emanated 
from the fact that powerful European states have not backed up this idea and they preferred 
rather small nations/states in the region. The Balkans have become politically, economically 
and militarily strategic point for powerful European states in the nineteenth century. For Britain, 
Russian and France the region was highly important as it is perceived as a bridge to the Middle 
East and India. Nationalist movements thus were supported fiercely by these states. The Austro-
Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires were in favour of the status quo in the Balkans. The 
interference of the Great Powers in Europe into the affairs of newly established Balkans states 
was so great that the ruling kings were imported from Western European countries into several 
Balkan states. For example, the first kings of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania were members of 
European dynasties. The kings tried to integrate into their new country by choosing traditional 
names and were baptized as Orthodox Christians.  
That said, politics of these states were highly dependent on foreign powers such as Britain, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia. Particularly the strategic location of the Greek state made possible 
the interference of European powers in local politics on regular basis. Different powers 
competed with each other for the enhancement of their influence and prestige in the region. As 
the British Ambassador to Athens (Sir Edmund Lyons) wrote in 1841: ‘A Greece truly 
independent is an absurdity. Greece is Russian or she is English; since she must not be Russian, 
it is necessary that she be English’ (Clogg, 1992, p.53). This statement shows the standpoint of 
the Great Powers at the time. The first leader of liberated Greece Capo D’Istria25 was ousted 
from power and Greece threw its lots with Britain (Ortaylı, 2008, p. 114; Veremis, 2014, p. 24). 
After the defeat of Greece against the Ottoman army in 1897 foreign intervention saved Greece 
from more disastrous outcomes, and yet because of this assistance, the Greek state has been 
indebted to the foreign bondholders that undermined the sovereignty of Greek state. (Veremis, 
2014, p. 42). As Greece partnered up with Britain, Romania and Serbia chose France and Russia 
respectively (ibid., p. 25). Bulgaria was first supported by Russia, but the Macedonian question 
between Serbia and Bulgaria caused estrangement between these two Balkan states and paved 
the way for gradual rapprochement between Bulgaria and Germany. These examples showed 
                                                 
25 Ioannis Kapodistrias was the former foreign minister of Russia under the rule of Tsar Alexander the First. Even 
though he supported liberal values, the British government regarded him as a Russian sympathiser. 
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us that the newly established Balkan states were in effect highly dependent on more powerful 
European states militarily and economically in their domestic and foreign policies. This 
occurred partly as well due to the policies of the Balkan intelligentsia that looked upon the 
Western/Central European states and emulate their way of life and constantly looking for 
protection. However, one must bear in mind that a Balkan confederation of large ethnically 
mixed states, where the rights of the minorities were respected by international guarantee, never 
would have the chance of getting off the ground in such a cynical atmosphere of realpolitik 
(Gallagher, 2001, p.47).  
The attempt of the establishment of a larger Bulgarian state including present-day Macedonia 
and the northern part of Greece under the San Stefano Agreement was prevented by mainly 
Britain on the grounds that a larger Bulgaria was perceived as an extension of Russian State 
and would have changed the balance of power in the region. The Congress of Berlin enabled 
the independence of Balkan states, albeit with huge problems. One of them was the neglection 
of ethnoconfessional factors during the state-building process for instance, Albania won 
independence in 1913, yet more than half of ethnic Albanians had to reside in other territories. 
Other states had to face this situation as well. Due to these reasons in the first half of the 20th 
century, the state policy of Balkan states focused on the conquering of the territories that would 
be considered as historically or demographically part of the state. Consequently, many conflicts 
and wars broke out such as the Balkan and World Wars. 
2.4 Socialism versus Nationalism in the 20th Century 
It is true that nationalism created nation-states but throughout the history different ideologies 
have emerged as a reaction to other ideologies. Socialism was the most successful ideology that 
challenged nationalism, however, it could not manage to surpass it. In this chapter, I will discuss 
the socialism and its failure against nationalism in the Balkans with a special focus on the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
As a matter of fact, socialist thinking in the Balkans could be traced back to the 19th century. 
However, that socialist thinking was influenced by the Russian populism movement. According 
to the Marxism, the revolution of the proletariat could only take place in highly industrialized 
countries whereas Russia and most of the states in Southeast Europe could not enter the 
capitalist stage, they were mainly peasant communities. Hence, writers such as Herzen argued 
that Russia and countries in the same situation should bypass the capitalist stage of development 
and proceed directly to socialism through the peasant communes (Mishkova & Daskalov, 2014, 
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p. 72). These ideas were transported to the Balkans through various intellectuals such as 
Svetozar Markovic in Serbia, Ante Radic in Croatia (ibid.). This socialist movement called 
radicalism was a reaction both to the dangers of capitalism but also to the socialist thought of 
the West. It is important to acknowledge that economic differences existed between Western 
and (South)Eastern European countries in the 19th century, as the latter was composed of 
agricultural societies and industrialization remained highly weak. In a sense, they were required 
to skip the capitalist stage otherwise, they would become dependent on foreign investment 
which would have crippled their sovereignty. The only way to direct passage to communism 
went through the modernization and transformation of peasant communities through rational 
lines into an association similar to workers association existing in Western Europe (Dimou, 
2009a). In fact, for them, the capitalist stage of development did not reflect a progressive era as 
traditional Marxists argue, on the contrary, it was a regressive process that should have been 
avoided. This movement differed from classical Marxism, since it rejected the proletarian 
revolution and abolition of the state. Rather, it underlined the cooperation with the state by 
considering the rights of massive peasant communities. Having said that, the radical movement 
lost ground after the integration of national economy into the global economy, for they could 
not be self-sufficient and needed to produce more to make money.  
It is worth noting that communism was the most resistant ideology that could challenge the 
nationalist structure of the Southeastern European states. It is true that communism is often 
considered as an anti-nationalist movement and it is the less nationalistic in comparison with 
other ideologies. Communist parties have been established after the first world war in Southeast 
Europe. One big step was the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.26 
Communist leaders rejoiced at this unification and considered as a success in their struggle 
against capitalism and nationalism (Uzgel, n.d., p. 219). Nonetheless, ethnic conflicts and 
tensions could not have been stopped especially after the renaming the country as the Kingdom 
of Yugoslav the state has become more authoritarian and oppressive and a tacit Serbianization 
process has started. During the 1930s ultra-nationalism commenced to gain ground in many 
countries including Southeast European states and during the Second World War many 
atrocities have been committed in the name of nationalism. However, a new order has been 
established after the Second World War i.e. the world has been divided into two parts and 
accordingly two-third was going to be under the control of the Allies, and one-third under the 
                                                 
26 After the assassination of the King Alexander the name of the state has been changed as the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. 
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Soviet Union (Simms, 2014, p. 382). Except for Greece, most of Southeast Europe went under 
the Soviet control. The Yugoslav-Soviet split occurred at a very early stage in 1948 because, 
unlike other Balkan countries, Yugoslavian lands have been freed by the fighters of Josip Broz 
Tito, not by the Soviet Army, and thus Tito’s reputation was certainly higher among the 
communists. Accordingly, the Yugoslav regime has emancipated itself and followed a different 
path than Moscow. Albania broke the ties with the Soviet Union in 1968 when the latter 
quenched the uprising in Prague brutally and left the Stalinist policy, and thus Albania remained 
as a stronghold of Stalinist communism in the Balkans. On the other hand, Bulgaria could be 
considered as the most loyal ally of Moscow and even president Todor Zhivkov proposed to 
make Bulgaria 16th republic of the Soviet Union (ibid.).  
In this chapter, I will delve into the Yugoslav case because the state encompassed most of the 
Balkans territories and has special features in many ways. Yugoslavia was a special case due to 
its earlier emancipation from Moscow and its federative structure which was designed to pacify 
and combine the national aspirations of several Slavic nations but later actually became the 
incubator of their nationalism (Marinov and Vezenkov, 2014, p. 472). Unlike the Soviet Union, 
national differences have been underlined and emphasized. Basically, the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Uvalić, 2018, “The birth of the Yugoslav model of socialism”, para. 
2) was composed of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia) and two autonomous regions (Vojvodina for Hungarians and Kosovo 
for Albanians). It was not the intention of communist leaders to create a new common Yugoslav 
nation, but they intended to create a socialist Yugoslav awareness among the citizens of 
Yugoslavia (Uzgel, n.d., p. 225) as Yugoslav communist leaders regarded nationalism not as a 
serious threat i.e. nationalism was merely a temporary necessary stage for the history of 
humankind that would eventually be replaced with the ideas of communism.27  
Edvard Kardelj, who was a friend of Tito and one of the leading political theorists of the 
communist party, argued that nationalism was the ideology of bourgeoisie class and when the 
capitalist mode of production comes to an end through procession into the socialism, 
nationalism will automatically be terminated and remained only as a chapter in history books 
(ibid., p. 222) Indeed, this statement articulated the ideas of communist leaders at the time. In 
this case, nationalism would have been evaporated after the incorporation into full-fledged 
socialist system. Therefore, they did not regard nationalism as a threat and the focus remained 
                                                 
27 However, they failed to create a common Yugoslav nation because according to the population census in 1981 
only %5 of the population considered themselves as Yugoslavs (Uzgel, n.d., p. 230) 
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particularly on economic affairs. It was probably a huge mistake, since nationalism is a socio-
political phenomenon and could not be replaced with only economic/financial responses. 
According to Kardelj (ibid.), main reason of the emergence of nationalism in Yugoslavia was 
the economic inequalities between Yugoslav nations/states stemming from capitalist mode of 
production and he added socialism would put an end to the nationalistic conflicts. 
Decentralization was also another important feature of the Yugoslav case. By doing so, they 
aimed to eliminate any possible ethnic conflict among different nationalities within the state. 
Nevertheless, these attempts failed in the long run that could be explained by several reasons. 
First, nationalist sentiments always existed among the Balkan people throughout this era. To 
make matters worse, Balkan communism was deeply nationalistic in nature, as a matter of fact, 
these communist regimes were populist development dictatorships justified in terms of the unity 
of the nation and its right and need to catch up with the capitalist world, so argued William 
Hagen (1999, para. 9). Marinov and Vezenkov (2014, p. 471) classified this type of communism 
as national communism and in the case of Bulgaria, he argued it was communist nationalism. 
The differences were minimal, policies and governance of Balkan states have contained ideas 
of nationalism. Communist leaders combined communist ideology with nationalism without 
seeing a contradiction, and thus national communism was born. It was an anti-Stalinist 
phenomenon in the Yugoslav case and for other countries it could be considered as a post-
Stalinist phenomenon(ibid.). Almost all Balkan states experienced tensions and conflicts with 
their own ethnic minorities and the taken measures were profoundly nationalistic as in the case 
of the Turks in Bulgaria or Hungarian minority in Romania. This kind of thinking undoubtedly 
undermined the real values of socialism that eventually caused ethnic strife and conflicts.  
Secondly, economic inequalities could not be abolished and the income inequality between the 
states grew much more that caused even more animosities. Moreover, by the 1980s the 
Yugoslav State was in a severe economic crisis (Uvalić, 2018, “Reform blueprints vs. economic 
outcomes”, para. 8) and when the Cold War was over the foreign aid has been cut off that made 
the things even much worse. The point is that there was a huge economic mismanagement that 
led into the collapse of the state from which nationalist leaders could easily make profit for their 
own economic goals as the nationalist ideas were still very well alive. It should be 
acknowledged that nationalism could not be erased merely by economic equalities in the 20th 
century because the whole world system based on it and creating a single Yugoslav nation was 
not possible, since it has been correlated with Serbian hegemony emanating from the past events 
in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Uzgel, n.d., p. 221). The central feature is here that socialist 
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economies whether in Yugoslavia or elsewhere were prone to decline due to the competition 
between the capitalists and communists worlds, clearly the latter had no chance of winning at 
the modern era because of the fact that the countries whose economies based on liberal economy 
were at the stage of constant production and innovation, whereas the socialist countries had 
stabilized nature and lacked innovation. As Hungarian philosopher Michael Polanyi (Palmer, 
1990, para.4) argued this was a conspicuous production that means production for the sake of 
production. For instance, steel was produced to make a factory to make more steel to make 
more factories, but this whole process did not produce any real consumer goods i.e. productions 
did not help to increase the standard of living that should be the essence of production (ibid., 
para. 4). In this regard, nationalism was and is the easiest way to gather public support and 
generate enthusiasm, so the fiscal problems and inequalities laid the foundations for the re-
emergence of nationalism. Besides, the old communist regimes created an authoritarian culture 
that makes it possible for nationalism to regain ground in the Balkans (Mungiu & Krastev, 
2004, p. 64). It is clear that authoritarianism, communism and nationalism are correlated (ibid., 
p. 64). Both nationalism and communism are authoritarian doctrines and it does not come as a 
surprise nationalism has reemerged after the fall of communist regimes. 
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3 POPULARITY OF NATIONALISM FROM OTHER PERSPECTIVES 
3.1 Education and Nationalism 
For the formation and expansion of nationalism, two important factors played a pivotal role viz. 
education and media. Hobsbawm (2012, p. 10) believed that nationalism is constructed from 
above, however, it needs to be studied below as this is where it takes roots and is the most 
powerful. Thus, it is important to develop a bottom-up approach to understand the origins and 
popularity of nationalism.  
Education is an important instrument that deserved further research and analysis regarding its 
contribution to nationalism. Especially primary and secondary education in schools (state-
controlled institutions) affect the shaping of ideas and thoughts of humans enormously. The 
children before puberty are curious and they are keen on learning, however, at this point, parents 
and school teachers play the most significant role in shaping the ideas and character of the 
young pupils. Particularly formal history education is highly effective in this regard. It is 
noteworthy that history education has a special mission which surpasses its educational tasks 
and turns it into an important instrument of state politics (Stojanović, n.d. para. 1). Seeing that 
historical process is fundamental to the development of any national identity, it is crucial to 
comprehend the history of the nation. Knowledge of history, even a cursory one, is particularly 
important for obtaining a national identity (White, 2000, p. 61). The history textbooks have 
been written so that they can help the young individuals to obtain a national awareness and give 
them a basic knowledge regarding their enemies and allies. In fact, the history schoolbooks are 
not necessarily in agreement with the scholarly account as the important point here is not to 
teach history from an objective perspective, but to give students a national identity and prepare 
them to become good, law-abiding citizens. Hobsbawm stated that ‘they write-sometimes even 
fabricate- histories that demonstrate a unified past and emphasize an inevitable common 
destiny’ (as cited in White, 2000, p. 62). By the same token, Millas (1991, p. 7) asserted that 
past events are fabricated or exaggerated without any historical context or understanding. For 
instance, almost all Balkan national historiographies narrate a bleak version of Ottoman rule 
and exaggerated the importance of the medieval Balkan states (Gallagher, 2001, p. 23).  
It is possible to observe the same pattern in all Balkan states. Frasher Demaj, author of history 
textbooks in Kosovo, stated that it was normal for textbooks to contain some inaccuracies and 
added ‘I am one of the persons who drafted the curriculum and I have been told by the Ministry 
of Education, Science and Technology that it is appropriate for students’ (Kosovo School 
Textbooks, 2010, para. 16). Moreover, it can be detected inaccuracies in many schoolbooks 
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regarding the population figures of Macedonia in the early 20th century as Bulgarian figures 
show Bulgarian majority, Serbian figures show Serbian majority and Greek figures show Greek 
majority (Euronews, 2009, 4:55). Examples abound in this respect. As the nineteenth-century 
French historian Ernest Renan argued that ‘Getting history wrong is an essential part of being 
a nation’ thus as it seems getting history right is also an essential part of building peace in the 
Balkans (Knezević, 2016, para.15).  
The history education in the Balkans can be associated with the title of the movie ‘The Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly’ (Papadakis, 2000). At this point, the good is our nation/state whereas the 
bad is the others, particularly the nation that is considered as the historical enemy. Finally, the 
ugly can be the third party that is taking side with the so-called historical enemy. Historian 
Dubravka Stojanović and others (Pavle Nikic, 2013, 40:25) analyzed the textbooks in 12 
southeast European countries from Slovenia and Turkey and came to a conclusion that there is 
no single truth, on the contrary, various interpretations of history exist in the books. She (ibid.) 
also asserted that there are completely diverging opinions on the two sides of the trench so what 
is needed is that reflection on the perception of the other side that is called multi-perspective 
reflecting regarding the past and present from various angles because the truth is more complex 
than we think.  
Mathematics or physics are universal and do not change from country to country basically it is 
the same everywhere, and yet historiographies might be different i.e. the same event could be 
narrated in very different ways. If one goes through different schoolbooks of various countries, 
then one will face many different historiographies and realities. Not only different states 
produce distinct historical narratives but also in the same country different historiographies 
could be existed such as the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Vukovar in Croatia. As it is 
well known, three distinct communities live in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats and they all have a separate curriculum for the students. That means; Bosnians, 
Croats and Serbs live in the same country, yet they have different knowledge and perception of 
history (TRT Avaz, 2015, 6:15). Especially when it comes to the Ottoman rule three completely 
different narratives are present (Alibašić, 2007). It can be stated that the schoolbooks for 
Bosniak students have the most tolerable picture of the Ottomans, whereas the Serbian 
narratives are mostly negative in this regard (ibid.).28 
                                                 
28 The same pattern could be observed in Vukovar, since Serb and Croat students go to school in different times 
and learn different historiographies. (Jelinčić, 2013, para. 18). 
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It should be clearly stated that it cannot be denied the huge effects of education and its 
contribution to the empowerment of national feelings. Certainly, there is nothing wrong to have 
a national identity, however, the point which should be underlined here is the contents of the 
education that not only gives students an identity but also a negative perception of others. In 
the Balkans and elsewhere, national identities are set in opposition to a threatening ‘other’. 
There is the Serbian image of the alienated Croat, the Slovenian image of the backward Serbian, 
the Greek image of warmongering Turk (Hatzoupoulos, 2008, p. 39). These images are created 
in our minds through socializing institutions even though we are not aware of it because we 
regard it as something natural. The point is that nationalism thrives on creating a common fiend 
so that the nation remains always united and would act collectively, and yet this situation may 
create conflicts among neighboring states, and sometimes among different nations within the 
same state, at the same time. Historian Stojanović (as cited in Lakić, 2013, p.27) describes the 
history education in the Balkans in those words:  
In most countries of the region the created image conjures historical correctness of their own 
nation, and historical events in textbooks are interpreted in a way that gives an impression that 
most neighboring peoples have territorial aspirations. Textbooks assume a positivist, 
traditional approach to history as the sum of a number of terrifying facts. Factual history 
presents the past only as a string of conflicts, mistrust and crimes, intensifying a feeling that 
hostility and conflicts are natural and immutable. 
Basically, it can be stated that this kind of nationalist thinking paves the way for the problems 
and crises emanating from merely ethnic hatred. This kind of history education creates an image 
in our minds and in that image the wars and conflicts are natural. In fact, nationalism is an 
ideology based on the strategy of stigmatization and emulation of the threatening Other 
(Jaffrelot, 2003, p. 31). Notions such as equality among nations or civilizations derive from the 
interactions of different cultures are not to be found in history textbooks (Millas, 1991, p. 5). It 
is clear that every culture has and still is largely affected by other cultures. This is not something 
surprising as humans are curious and adventurous creatures i.e. they migrate, travel, trade, wage 
wars and plunder and report back what they have found out about the customs, lifestyles of 
others (Waldron, 2000, p. 232). As a result of this, one cannot argue that any civilization is 
merely pure and unaffected by other cultures. Nonetheless, the contributions of the others to 
national history and culture were not seen as an integral part of the national narrative and were 
largely ignored (Dimou, 2009b). Therefore, history is often used as a propaganda instrument 
by focusing on the glories and sufferings of the nation and disregarding the sufferings of others 
(Papadakis, 2008). However, Stojanović contends that we should reflect on the perception of 
the other side, since they have the right to their own perception as much as we do (Pavle Nikic, 
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2013, 41:25). In addition to this, Papadakis (2008) argues that it would be useful to examine 
and reflect upon various models with regard to history teaching in primary and secondary 
schools. Northern European countries have initiated a project in which the idea of teaching 
national history has been largely abandoned in favor of teaching world history with inserts at 
appropriate points on how their society’s history fits in or diverges from the rest of the world 
(ibid.).  
Another remarkable example could be the publication of joint French-German history 
schoolbooks despite the huge difficulties. These books were published in 2006 so as to be 
studied in German and French schools whose aim was to provide the students a broader 
perspective to the historical events. Moreover, these books are so far rarely used as regular 
schoolbooks in both countries because of the fact that the deviations from the national standards 
are felt as shortcomings (ibid, p. 145). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that it is still a 
breakthrough in this field, as it was the first time in history that two countries came together 
and published a joint history schoolbook (Deutsch-französisches Geschichtsbuch, 2006, para. 
2) which does not narrate historical events from the national perspectives but from a binational 
standpoint so that students may interpret the past in a critical and objective way. Furthermore, 
in 2016, Poland and Germany published a joint history schoolbook29in which the students may 
learn the history of Europe from both German and Polish perspectives (Beitzer, 2016, para. 7). 
It should be underlined these are useful examples because this kind of projects could serve as 
models for improving the schoolbooks of Southeastern European countries as well (from 
Slovenia to Turkey). 
Nonetheless, the problem is that there are not enough incentives in the Balkans for the 
implementation of these policies, meaning, the history education in the schools has become an 
instrument for the politics. Hence, there is no pushing factor to change it. On the one hand, most 
people are content with the national myths that they learned in the schools (Millas, 1991, p. 17), 
on the other hand, politicians use this situation as a bargaining chip while negotiating with the 
neighboring states. Hence, only minor changes in the textbooks could be observed. As Foucault 
argued that knowledge generates, constructs, institutionalizes and reconfigures position of 
power in evident or unseen/sophisticated ways (Dimou, 2009b, p. 34). Therefore, if we want to 
understand how power functions we should not look into the parliaments but institutions such 
as schools, hospitals etc. because in effect politics takes place in these places. Moreover, 
                                                 
29 The book is called Europe-Our History (Europa- Unsere Geschichte/Europa-Nasza Historia) 
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according to Gramsci (Pagano, 2017, p. 63), every relationship of hegemony is necessarily a 
pedagogical relationship, since the ruling class managed to impose their ideas on the masses by 
peaceful means.  
Some international projects have been developed throughout the years in order to address the 
issue concerning history schoolbooks in Southeastern European states. One of them, which 
drew my attention, was initiated by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast 
Europe in Thessaloniki (Stojanović, 2009, p. 156). The aim was to gather controversial topics 
from history textbooks of numerous Southeast European states and demonstrate how different 
sides interpreted the same events in different ways (ibid., p. 156). It is a crucial point because 
it is of necessity to understand the perceptions of the others and manage to evaluate the events 
from different perspectives.  
However, it would be a win-win situation if the perception of others would be changed in the 
Balkans because once ethnic prejudices and hatreds vanish then perpetual peace in the region 
may be achieved. It can be argued that it is feasible to carry out non-nationalist policies and 
achieve common gains through cooperation. The problem is not related to obtaining a national 
identity but rather depicting of the others in a negative, hostile way which makes nationalism 
stronger and dangerous. It should be noted that it creates unnecessarily animosities between 
Southeastern European nations that in return causes conflicts and wars. It is important to change 
the negative images of the others not only for the sake of history but also for maintenance of 
the peace. Political scientist Puhovski argues that Balkan states may only have democratic 
prosper future if they know their history correctly, but currently they are far from this fact 
(Rathfelder, 2017, para.13). 
3.2 Media and Nationalism 
During the nineteenth century, the newspapers have a played highly significant role in the 
formation of modern nations by spreading national consciousness among the people. Seeing 
that most people were illiterate at the time the education has gained importance and these 
developments paved the way for the attainment of national identity. Not only nations but also 
the languages were constructed to provide a national unity. At the time of French revolution, 
half of the population could not speak standard French but mostly Patois or even other 
languages like Catalan, Provençal, Breton etc. (Yalecourses, 2009, 19:50). Standard German 
has been created because it was necessary for the German unification. The newspapers used 
these standard languages deriving from high cultures to inform people about their national past 
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and identity. The newspapers first appeared in Italy during the Renaissance to inform people 
regarding mercantile events (Ortaylı, 2008, p. 280). In the nineteenth century, the newspapers 
were cultural instruments that teach history, geography, grammar to the readers, basically it has 
a different function than today. Ortaylı (ibid., p. 280) argued that Balkan nationalism is indebted 
to the newspaper, as it was the most important instrument that helped the formation of their 
modern national identities. The first Greek newspaper was published in Vienna in 1790 
(Mastoridis, n.d., p. 76). Others followed this trend relatively much later e.g. Konstantin 
Fotinov published the first Bulgarian newspaper Lyuboslovye in 1842 in Izmir (Ortaylı, 2008, 
p. 280). The aim of this newspaper was to teach the history and Bulgarian language to the 
Bulgarians. Fotinov argued that the Bulgarians should learn geography to know their country, 
learn grammar for their native language and history for the glorious past and promising future 
(ibid, p. 282). Other newspapers e.g. Tsarigradski Vestnik, Dunavski Lebed, Mirozrenie 
followed this path (ibid., pp. 284-285). It could be stated that in the age of formation of nations 
and nation-states, the newspapers raised national consciousness and integration among all strata 
of the society. 
Due to the advancement of the informational technologies, the role of media has increased 
immensely. Not only newspapers but television channels, radio programs and newly emerging 
social media still keep national sentiments strong. Television is important in a sense that they 
bring distant areas closer within the national borders so that we can create bonds with the people 
we do not know. The televisions can be influential to hate other nations particularly in times of 
crisis and wars. In addition to the news; mass media delivers films, series and other elements to 
audiences that would be effective in this regard (Yutaka, 2008, p. 5).  
However, it should be emphasized that media has played clearly a vital role for the formation 
of nations and keeping nationalist sentiments alive, but its effects are limited, since school 
education is more influential, as it is the earliest phase of the acquirement of information. At 
this stage, children accept anything they have been taught and only in later stages of life people 
commence to question what they have learned. It is, of course, a difficult phase, for it is not 
easy to unlearn what we have learned in the early phases of our lives and not many people have 
the possibility to do so. In this case, nationalism remained as a strong identifier. The media thus 
functions solely keeping our national feelings alive, as people tend to choose and acknowledge 
the information which they please. It is a psychological aspect and called Motivated Reasoning 
(Leeper & Mullinix, 2018). Basically, we accept the information if it is in accordance with our 
beliefs and goals otherwise, it becomes merely fake news. Climate change is the perfect 
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example in this regard. Since huge majority of scientists argue that the climate change is real 
and caused by human activities (Cook et al., 2016) and may have serious ramifications for our 
world, some people and political parties may deny this fact merely based on these motivational 
reasons. This is also true with regard to nationalism because everyone tends to think that his/her 
nation is always right, and the others remain unjust and wrong.  
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4 GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM 
4.1 Defining Globalization 
Definition of globalization is quite a difficult task because it means many things to many people 
as Andreas Bush put it (Sabanadze, 2010, p. 16). Anthony Giddens (ibid. p. 18) wrote that 
globalization means the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away 
and vice versa. It is possible to deduce that national states can no longer cut themselves off from 
one another and new relations of power and competition, conflict and intersection take shape 
between national states and transnational actors, identities, situations and processes (Beck 2015, 
p. 21). In the 21st century, people are entering an era of intensification of worldwide 
interconnectedness where all states become dependent on each other one way or another, as 
daily four trillion dollars flow across the world’s foreign exchange markets or transnational 
corporations account for 25 or 33 percent of world output, 70 percent of world trade and 80 
percent of international investment (Mcgrew, 2014, p. 16). The number of international 
institutions and their offshoots increased from a few hundred in 1950 to more than 7,000 today 
(Hale & Held, 2017, para. 4) and it seems they will keep increasing. Under the circumstances, 
power relations are subject to a comprehensive alteration because national states must redefine 
the relations between themselves to keep themselves in the game.  
It should be noted that globalization is not a very recent phenomenon even though it was 
considered that way by many. Throughout the history various communities, political entities 
interacted with each other and thereby they have influenced one another through these 
interactions e.g. trade, travel and even battles etc. The inhabitants of this era were rarely aware 
of each other beyond their own experience or solely dimly so through the presence of objects 
from afar and stories told by travelers whereas now globalization has become a mass 
phenomenon as a form of human consciousness (Eriksen, 2014, p. 6). Discovery of America by 
European powers and colonization process could be regarded as the starting point of the 
intensification of worldwide relations, however, it should be noted that most of these areas were 
subject to European regulations and laws. It was the around 1960s when new power relations 
began to take shape through revolutions and technological advancements. 
Globalization is not only related to the economy but also it has multi dimensions such as 
ecological, informational, cultural etc. It would be of essence to touch upon this point very 
briefly. Some argue that the cultural effects of globalization are even more influential than those 
of economic factors.  It is possible to talk about American cultural hegemony over the rest of 
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the world through American movies, television shows, music and so on. Nonetheless, it is not 
only a one-way ticket in effect all cultures nolens volens were affected by each other. It is true 
that cultures, which can produce more, are one step ahead before others; however, the American 
culture also is exposed to the effects of other cultures particularly Latin culture through the 
immigration from Central and South American states. By the same token, the French culture 
has been infused with Arabic-Maghreb and African culture that can be observed in French songs 
or the national football/basketball players of France are composed of various ethnic 
backgrounds which would not have been the case a century ago. For these reasons, globalization 
should not be regarded as a new form of Western/American hegemony. In fact, it would be 
more appropriate to call this phenomenon as the hegemony/imperialism of the Universal as 
Bourdieu put it (Sabanadze, 2010, p. 29).  
Furthermore, ecological dimension should be noted as well because the current problems, which 
nation-states face, cannot be solved only through national methods because the international 
cooperation is required in order to overcome these problems. The climate change is undoubtedly 
one of these issues that should be addressed by collectively through the cooperation of all 
national states, since the effects and outcomes of it would endanger all entities.  
Nevertheless, not all authors are in accordance with the effects of globalization and some see 
the matter from another perspective. Most skeptics argue that what we are now witnessing is 
not globalization but rather a process of internationalization and regionalization, and nation-
states still remain the most important actors in the international political field (Eriksen, 2014, 
p. 8). The fact that nationalism and state power are not declining, on the contrary, they are on 
the increase, but this could be regarded as a reaction and response to the effects of globalization. 
Most people, particularly the older ones, witness the rapid change around their surroundings 
stemming from increasing interconnectedness that makes them quite uneasy because they liked 
their countries as they were used to be in the past (League of Nationalist, 2016, “Nations Once 
Again”, para. 4). However, it should be noted that younger generations, between 18-24, are 
more optimistic concerning the effects of globalization, as they less tend to vote for nationalist 
parties according to a poll that was conducted in the United Kingdom, France and Germany 
(ibid., “Nations Once Again”). Thus, it can be argued that the rise of nationalism would not last 
long as future generations could adapt themselves to new developments more easily. 
David Graeber argues that global neoliberalism differs from globalization and it is simplistic 
and misleading to describe the reactions to global neoliberalism as anti-globalization (as cited 
in Eriksen, 2001, p. 12). The recent social movements around the globe ranging from ATTAC 
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in France to Occupy Movement in the United States, the slum Dweller Alliance in Mumbai, 
India and Los indignados in Spain do not oppose to global connectedness and international 
cooperation but reject the narrowly profit-seeking neoliberalist version of globalization which 
they regard as dehumanizing and oppressive (ibid., p. 12).  
4.2 Rise of Nationalism in the Age of Globalization 
It can be argued that today our world is more interconnected than ever. That being said, it should 
be noted that we are witnessing a dialectical contradictory process in which on the one hand, 
individuals and states interact more, on the other hand, the popularity of nationalism is 
increasing not only in the Balkans but around the whole world. Far-right parties, which are 
against globalization and organizations like the European Union, can attract more voters and 
commenced to take part in both local and national assemblies and some of them could form a 
coalition just as the case in Austria or Poland. It could be speculated that more far-right parties 
have the possibility to get in power in other EU countries.  
First, the main perception was the basic return of the nationalism under the label of ancient 
hatreds and deep-rooted animosities among Balkan nations. Yet this explanation was too 
simplistic. Hence, democratic transition theory has been brought forward mainly arguing that 
democratization process gave rise to nationalism, since it serves the interests of national elites 
and political actors who wanted to strengthen their hold on political arena (Synder, 2000, p. 
36). In the transition era, they took advantage of this opportunity through instrumentalization 
of ancient animosities and deep-seated rivalries. As a matter of fact, nationalism is the best and 
easiest way to generate enthusiasm for the state (League of Nationalist, 2016, “Nations Once 
Again”, para. 3) and that is how most nationalist politicians held power in many Balkan states 
in the early stages of collapse of the communist regimes. Besides, realist school held the view 
that uncertainty and insecurity accompany state failure and anarchy, as nationalism thrives 
under conditions of fear and insecurity by mobilizing and fracturing groups along ethnic lines 
(Sabanadze, 2010, p. 11).  
Nowadays the main problem for the Southeast European states is the ethnic strife and conflicts 
e.g. Kosovo issue, the fragile situation of the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia, Macedonia name 
dispute etc. All these conflicts emanate from nationalistic feelings that cause crisis and 
confrontations. However, it should be noted that these conflicts are fabricated, meaning, they 
are not real problems. The only way-out is considered as the full membership in the European 
Union. That being said, this kind of thinking is not plausible. Firstly, it would be problematic 
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for the European Union to accept these states before they solve the conflicts among themselves, 
since they would merely import more conflicts into the Union, which is something, they would 
not prefer. Secondly, probably due to the long process of membership negotiations the majority 
of the citizens of Serbia and Bosnia do not think that they would be better off through the 
entrance into the European Union (Rcc.int, 2018, p. 51). As a matter of fact, these nationalistic 
conflicts create the hugest obstacle for the acceptance of the Western Balkan states30into the 
Union.  
Not only in the Balkans, but also almost all around the globe the nationalism is on the rise. It is 
a paradoxical and confusing situation because on the one hand, interconnectedness and 
globalization are at the highest stage, on the other hand, it can be observed that nationalist and 
authoritarian leaders get elected as presidents and come to power in many countries. Not only 
in the United States but also in many countries ranging from China to Ethiopia, New Zealand 
to Central European this trend could be observed (Cowen, 2017). This is not related to 
economics, rather this trend can be correlated with increasing effects of globalization, meaning 
that, the nation-states and national identities are in danger (ibid.). There is no serious doubt that 
the effects of globalization undermine the sovereignty of nation-states in numerous ways. 
Steingard and Fitzgibbons (as cited in Lerche, 1998, “Globalization and Conflict”, para. 8) 
argue that ‘the values of Globalization, transmitted through satellite television and the 
distribution of worldwide publications, permeate everyone's life. Global marketing, 
international stock markets, and the availability of nomadic world-wide venture capital 
complete the scene for the rise of a global market value system. No culture is protected by 
topography, tradition or just plain disinterest--essentially nobody is out of reach of the extended 
arm of Globalization.’ 
So, it is crystal clear that the modern nation-states must deal with the effects of globalization, 
however, the question is that nationalism and globalization are compatible with each other? 
Some argue that globalization and nationalism are two notions which would coexist at the same 
time, whereas the other view holds that they are antagonistic concepts that one threatens the 
existence of the other. Sabanazde (2010) gave the example of Georgia and Eastern European 
countries in her book because on the one hand, the nationalist forces favor globalization through 
integration in the European Union and NATO, on the other hand, they keep following 
nationalist policies. Nevertheless, this argument is not convincing. The main reason why these 
                                                 
30 Except Slovenia and Croatia, since they are already members of the European Union. 
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nationalist movements favor globalization originates from the pragmatic reasons, in other 
words, political and economic necessities play a huge role in this regard.  
‘Globalization is the antithesis of nationalism as it suggests that there are no boundaries (and) 
just one globe’ as John Kusumi put it (Erwin, 2017, para. 12). The developments in the field of 
transportation, telecommunication etc. made it possible for the people to communicate, travel, 
trade with the other parts of the world in a better way and there is no doubt that people know 
much more about the cultures and lifestyles of the others in comparison with previous centuries. 
As the states get weakened, the nationalist movements and policies commence to spring up such 
as the Scottish independence referendum, Catalan independence movements and the recent exit 
of the United Kingdom from the European Union. It does not come as a surprise these 
developments occurred in the last years. Since the hold of the state weakens, nationalism started 
to react against global tendencies (Sabanazde, 2010, p. 31). In the current system, the real 
political players are not nations but the tribes that are aiming to redraw the existing boundaries 
in order to divide (Barber, 1995). Today, the Bosnian Serb identity or Macedonian Albanian 
identity is stronger than ever. This tribal nationalism may cause the fragmentation of many 
states, since these states in fact do not correspond to the nation-states in the perfect sense. 
Walker Connor considers 12 of the 132 states as full-fledged nation-states, whereas Will 
Kymlicka qualifies merely 3 out of 184 states (Wiebe, 2002, p. 8). The philosopher Michael 
Oakshott has dismissed the entire crop by stating that ‘No European State (let alone an imitation 
European state elsewhere in the world) has ever come within measurable distance of being a 
nation state’ (ibid., p.8).  
So, there is no way to reconcile nationalism with globalization? Stuart Hall contends that there 
are three variations of how national identities may transform in the following ways: 
1. ‘National identities could be eroded as a result of the growth of cultural homogenization 
and global post-modernization. 
2. National and other ‘local’ or particular identities could be strengthened by resistance to 
globalization 
3. National identities could decline but new identities of a hybrid kind could take their place.’ 
(as cited in Janusauskiene, 2005, p.178) 
It can be argued that the third option seems more tenable because people and social communities 
have always identities that are changing and transforming constantly in accordance with the 
developments around the world. As a matter of fact, this is not such a complicated situation, 
since I resemble these developments with those in the 19th century when the national uprisings 
were sweeping through Europe. The Austrian Prince, Klemens von Metternich, aimed to stop 
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national movements and reinstate ancien régime order based on the divine right of kings. 
Certainly, he was not alone in this struggle as he formed an alliance with Russia and Prussia 
called the Holy Alliance. However, this alliance did not last long and nationalist movements 
could not be stopped by imperial powers in the long run. In a way; Trump, Putin or Le Pen are 
the Metternichs of our era as globalization undermines the sovereignty of nation-states. As in 
the case of emergence of nationalism, technological advancements and structural changes in 
political, social, cultural life may clear the way for new forms of political and social 
organization which could be difficult for us to imagine at the present. Having said that, the 
problems are about to change in the age of globalization, meaning, due to the fast technological 
and scientific advancements we are entering to a new age whose problems would be of different 
nature and subsequently their solutions would not be nation-oriented.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
Based on this study, it is possible to draw important conclusions with regard to nationalism. 
First, it is worth noting that nationalism is not merely a given, natural phenomenon but rather 
it is a construction born out of technological and scientific advancements in the late 18th century. 
Technological and scientific advancements refer to industrialization, improvement of mass 
communication and transportation such as telegraphs, printing machines or railroads that 
enables the empowerment of central authority and undermined the power of local lords. In the 
French case, it led to the absolutism while Britain became a strong parliamentary monarchy. 
Still, both countries managed to have a stronger central authority based on different models. 
Industrialization is crucial in a sense that did the groundwork for the emergence of workers’ 
class that changed the old social structure. Therefore, it would be incorrect to state that 
nationalism is always existent and natural as the societies were divided into different classes, 
mainly the nobility and the peasantry, whose interests were not used to overlap. The aristocracy 
used to associate with the other nobility even from different states and the peasantry among 
themselves. As it is clear, there was no pushing factor for their unification and yet owing to the 
newly emerging capitalist economy all classes started to need each other in a way which paved 
the way for the social cohesion.  
Hroch and others argued that three factors are necessary to become a nation i.e. a memory of 
common past, linguistic and cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication, 
and the conception of the equality of all members of the society (Biondich, 2011, p. 12). The 
third factor is especially important in this respect. In the pre-modernity, the people were aware 
of their ethnic ties as well, however, when we speak of nation and nationalism it refers to a form 
of political organization whose legitimacy based on the sovereignty of all equal members of the 
society, whereas before modernity the political community was imagined and lived in different 
ways from today (Billig, 1995, p. 21). People were aware of their ethnic ties; however, these 
ethnic identities were not essential from the political standpoint. 
It is highly difficult and complicated to explain nationalism with a single theory, as it is 
excessively complex and may vary from region to region. In this study, the focus was on 
Southeast Europe. It should be emphasized that nationalism emerged first in Western Europe 
owing to the aforementioned reasons and then this civic nationalism evolved into ethnic 
nationalism in Central Europe because of the influences of the romantic philosophy. 
Transmission of these ideas to the Balkans was carried out through the activities of the newly 
emerging intelligentsia and, of course, with the assistance of European states. 
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Since the lands of Southeast Europe have been shared by two dynasties viz. the Habsburg and 
the Ottomans, nation and state-building processes took different paths. The Habsburg Empire 
was an industrialized Central European state and contains many different ethnicities e.g. Poles, 
Hungarians, Czechs, Slovenes etc. Their nation-building process developed along the lines with 
romantic nationalism whose main criterion for the definition of the nation was the language. In 
this case, humanist ideas of the civic nationalism have been ignored and only the language was 
the most important determiner. Nevertheless, for the rest of Southeast Europe, the situation was 
quite different. Society formation of the Ottomans diverged from his western neighbor i.e. the 
communities were constructed along with the religious/confessional lines. They were Muslims, 
Romaic (Orthodox Population), Franks (Catholic population), Armenians, Jewish. It is also 
vital to mention that there are differences in the administration systems even within the same 
community. Not all members of the Romaic community enjoyed the same status e.g. Greeks 
were predominantly city-dwellers and merchants, Romanian lands were autonomous and had 
their own aristocracy whereas Serbs were under direct rule (Pashalik of Belgrade) of the 
Ottomans, but they have also a community in Karlowitz under the Habsburg rule that later has 
become cultural center of Serbian national movement (Stavrianos, 2000, p. 235). On the other 
hand, Bulgarians felt the Ottoman rule more directly due to its proximity to the capital and their 
national movement developed much later particularly with the help of Russian intellectuals and 
historians. These areas were not industrialized, and the economy was based on agriculture and 
livestock raising. The industrialization cleared the way for the initial emergence of nationalism 
in Western Europe, but it is not a determinant factor for the definition of nationhood i.e. nations 
could be even formed without industrialization, as nationalism has been spread through 
diffusion and emulation by the local intellectuals in the rest of the world.  
As mentioned earlier, three components were important for the nation-building process (not the 
emergence of nationalism) i.e. common past, common language and cultural ties and equality 
among its members of the community. Since the European colonial powers were at the peak of 
their powers in the 19th century, the main idea was that the path to development and 
modernization goes through nationalism. By the same token, Greek intellectuals wanted to set 
into effect the ideas of the French revolution in the Balkans, and yet it did not work out owing 
of the fact that the local political, social and economic dissimilarities did not permit it. The 
common past is particularly important for the nation basically the historical consciousness of 
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the Romanians31 and the Greeks32 diverged from each other remarkably that would cause the 
disentanglement of the former Romaic identity during nation-building era. Even if they had 
managed to form a united confederation it would have been a coercion that would have 
eventually led to the crisis and conflicts within the state such as the example of Yugoslavia. 
Serbian/Montenegrin disentanglement could be explained in this way because they speak the 
same language and share the same faith, and yet they formed different states in 1878 due to the 
different past, political and economic divergences. Whereas the Serbs were under direct control 
of the Ottomans, the Montenegrins had the autonomy namely they were ruled by their own 
princes. Agriculture was the main part of the Serbian economy, and yet the Montenegrins were 
busy with livestock raising particularly due to the geographical conditions. 
Basically, it could be stated that Balkan national movements started as a united movement but 
then disintegrated and triggered/influenced each other. As a general picture, Greek national 
movement initiated this trend followed by other Orthodox majority communities such as Serbs 
and Romanians as a reaction against Greek cultural hegemony and the Ottoman rule. 
Albanian/Bosniak movements emerged to obtain autonomy rights and against the 
encroachments of neighboring states, but Turkish nationalism has taken his shape after the 
failed attempt to create a common Ottoman identity within its territories. Nevertheless, in the 
Habsburg/Austria Empire, events followed a different path owing to the different structure of 
the state. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy granted more rights and 
privileges to the local lords, since they acquired these lands mostly through intermarriages and 
agreements (Jelavich, 1983, p. 127). As a result of this, local communities were self-sufficient 
to take care of their own businesses, and thus the nationalism among Habsburg communities 
has taken shape as a cultural awakening, whereas in the Ottoman Balkan communities, 
nationalism developed mostly in irredentist forms.  
It is vital to answer the question of where these nationalist sentiments and aspirations come 
from? Two factors have been found influential in this respect, namely historical and 
sociological reasons. First, one should know the nation-building process in the Balkans that 
diverges from the Western European/American model i.e. there are two variations which are 
ethnic nationalism in Slovenia stemming from the influence of the Habsburgs and 
ethnoconfessional nationalism, communal nationalism in Karpat’s (1997, p. 332) words, which 
                                                 
31 Romanian lands under Ottoman rule were autonomous, they had local nobility and their economy mostly based 
on agriculture. 
32 Greece was subject to the direct Ottoman rule, they lacked aristocracy, were predominantly city-dwellers and 
merchants. 
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blends ethnicity with religious elements, in the rest of Southeast Europe. It is important because 
other nationalism models have replaced religion and confined it into the private sphere of 
individuals, whereas for the Balkan nationalism religion is the determinant factor. Under the 
circumstances, nationalism went beyond from being a mere civic conception to a sacred 
phenomenon that makes it more dominating and popular among the people. That is also the 
reason why the Balkans are associated with excessive nationalism and ethnic animosities 
because they have a different understanding of nationalism. However, it does not mean that 
nationalism is only related to the Balkans, on the contrary, nationalism is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon that causes conflicts and wars all around the world.  
The association of the Balkans with extreme nationalism could be regarded as mere imaginings 
of the West. Due to the different nature of nationalism, the West could not comprehend clearly 
the origins of conflicts in the Balkans especially the conflicts between Serbs and Croats etc. as 
they share similar cultural values and speak (almost) the same language. This difference has 
been instrumentalized by Western European states in order to control the politics in the Balkans. 
Furthermore, the state-building process in the Balkans did not take place as it should have been 
i.e. the newly established Balkan states were highly far from being full-fledged nation-states 
because a considerable number of (any) nation had to reside in the territory of other states. This 
argument is valid almost for all states in Southeast Europe. The interventions of other European 
states into the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries have played an important role for this 
situation. Consequently, Balkan states went into war with each other in order to conquer and 
claim sovereignty on the lands of their neighbor states on demographic and historical grounds. 
These wars and their results could be regarded as the essence of socio-political problems in the 
region. 
Secondly, more importantly, the sociological factors that help the process of production of 
nationalism among the society. These sociological factors refer to the education in state-
controlled schools and the media. It should be noted that the latter plays a secondary and 
maintaining role while the former affects clearly in a remarkable way. Being the strongest 
socializing institutions controlled by the ruling elites, schools and their effects should not be 
underestimated. Foucauldian and Gramscian models are highly suitable to explain the huge 
effects of these institutions on our lives.  
This study analyzed different schoolbooks in various countries and the books that were written 
regarding this subject which helps me to come to the conclusion that the historical events are 
narrated not to inform students in any objective way, but to give them a strong national 
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awareness. Of course, it does not mean every student becomes nationalist, and yet the huge 
effects cannot be underestimated and overlooked, since the history/civic education is 
compulsory and lasts more than ten years in any country. It should be emphasized that the 
problem here is the imagining and depicting of the others in a negative way that undoubtedly 
causes political conflicts and wars for countries in the region. The negative images of the others, 
which feeds the national feelings, constructs unreal and imaginary problems that keep us busy 
trying to come up with imaginary solutions. The negative perception of the neighboring 
countries and alliances with other third parties put Balkan states in vulnerable position i.e. 
makes them dependent on other powers and creates obstacles for the close cooperation between 
the states in the region. Various models by several authors have been proposed with reference 
to history and civic education in schools, yet the most important solution is to change the 
negative/threatening image of other nations which does not benefit to any nation/state. Hence, 
education is highly crucial in this sense, as the wars and conflicts begin in our minds, it is still 
in our minds that the defenses of peace must be constructed (Stoeber, 2013, p. 27).  
It is true that long struggles and wars have left a bitter legacy in the Balkans that would be not 
easy to forget, but on the other hand, it should be noted the animosities and hostilities between 
neighboring states cause more troubles in a political as well as fiscal sense. The thing is that 
Balkan nations should not hate but to understand each other. Therefore, seeing that we are 
entering a new age, where the conflicts and problems would not be solved by solely national 
ways but through international cooperation, it is time to realize that these sorts of animosities 
do not serve any purpose. It can be stated that the nationalism is on the rise around the globe 
because of the fact that it is only a response and reaction to the increasing effects of 
globalization, however, eventually it is subjected to come to a halt. In this regard, it is of utmost 
importance to rethink and reconstruct of our national narratives in which the others should not 
be excluded and demonized but included in the national narratives as part of equal societies. 
My point here is to show that the negative perception of others stemming from nationalistic 
feelings is the epitome of problems in Southeast Europe that could be solved through the 
changes in sociological/pedagogical structures of the societies. Since the core of the matter lies 
in the historical formation of nationalism, it is needed to reconstruct a different postmodern 
interpretation of historical events. By doing so, it may be possible to achieve and maintain peace 
between the states/nations. 
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6 SUMMARY 
Nacionalizem je zahodno-evropski socialno-politični konstrukt, ki se je pojavil v poznem 18. 
stoletju s kombinacijo absolutizma, razsvetljenstva in industrijske revolucije. V pred-modernih 
časih se ljudje niso toliko identificirali z narodno oz. etnično pripadnostjo, predvsem zaradi 
tega, ker etno-lingvistične vezi niso imele politične pomembnosti za življenje posameznika. 
Socialno-politična organiziranost je bila zamišljena precej drugače kot danes. Pomembno je 
poudariti, da ni bilo prisotne socialne homogenosti med celotnim narodom, kvečjemu 
nasprotno, meje družbenih skupin so bile izredno močne in prehodi med skupinami tako močno 
oteženi. Pripadniki višjih slojev so se družili samo s pripadniki višjih slojev, enako je veljalo 
tudi za pripadnike nižjih slojev.  
Kdaj je torej nacionalizem postal pomemben? Seveda, ni mogoče podati točnega datuma in 
lokacije, ampak osnutke nacionalistističnega gibanja je možno opaziti v poznem 18. stoletju in 
zgodnjem 19. stoletju. Pomembno je poudariti, da ima nacionalizem več smeri razvoja. V 
zahodnem delu Evrope, na primer, je bil nacionalizem grajen na idejah izvirajoč iz obdobja 
razsvetljenstva in francoske revolucije, ki so poudarjala racionalnost in pravice posameznika. 
V osrednjem delu Evrope, se je nacionalizem razvijal pod vplivom romantičnih filozofov, ki so 
poudarjali avtentičnost narodov (ta smer je vplivala tudi na Slovenijo v času, ko je bilo to 
ozemlje del habsburške monarhije).  Za ostali del jugovzhodne Evrope pa je značilen model 
konfesionalnega nacionalizma, ki združuje nacionalizem z elementi verske pripadnosti.   
V zahodni in srednji Evropi je nacionalizem nadomestil vero in postal najbolj pomembnem 
dejavnik za legitimnost države. Nadomeščanje vere z nacionalizmom je bil rezultat gibanja 
razsvetljenstva. Območje Balkana je v času te preobrazbe verskega pripadanja z nacionalizmom 
spadalo pod Otomanski imperij ter tako imelo drugačno strukturo skupnosti. S tem ni doživel 
zgodovinskih sprememb kot so razsvetljenstvo in reformacija. Za otomansko družbo je bil 
najpomembnejši dejavnik verska pripadnost, v skladu s to pripadnostjo so bile razdeljene tudi 
skupnosti. Tako ni presenetljivo, da je nacionalizem na Balkanu močno prepleten z verskimi 
elementi. 
Socializem je bil velik izziv nacionalizmu, a ga ni mogel nadomestiti. Pravzaprav je bil 
socializem na Balkanu po naravi izredno nacionalistično naravnan. Socialistični režim, ki je 
gradil avtoritativno kulturo vladanja, je tlakoval pot za vrnitev nacionalizma. Danes, 
izobraževanja in mediji igrajo pomembno vlogo v ustvarjanju nacionalističnih in pripadnostih 
občutkov med ljudmi. Vredno je omeniti, da so zaradi zakonsko obveznega šolanja, 
izobraževalne ustanove najpomembnejše institucije v procesu socializacije, še posebej s 
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poučevanjem zgodovine. Učbeniki o zgodovini so lahko prirejeni in tako predstavljajo 
drugačna dejstva o drugih etničnih skupinah oziroma narodih. Prirejanje zgodovinskih dejstev 
se tako ne navezuje toliko na krepitev lastne identitete ampak predvsem na projekcijo drugih 
identitet kot negativnih oz. sovražnih. To pa seveda lahko opolnomoči nacionalizem in občutek 
večvrednosti, s tem pa povzroča sovražnost med državami jugovzhodne Evrope in poglablja 
politično in ekonomsko nestabilnost. Neodvisnost Kosova in spor glede imena Makedonije sta 
le dva izmed mnogih primerov. Izrednega pomena je torej sprememba negativne podobe drugih, 
ne samo zaradi zgodovinskih dejstev ampak tudi zaradi ohranjanja miru v regiji. 
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